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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CURRENT LEGAL BARRIERS TO
TELEMEDICINE IN THE UNITED
STATES: ANALYSIS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS OF ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
HEALTH CARE REFORM
Amar Guptat and Deth Saott
ABSTRACT
The current health care crisis in the United States compels a con-
sideration of the crucial role that telemedicine could play towards
deploying a pragmatic solution. The nation faces rising costs and dif-
ficulties in access to and quality of medical services. Telemedicine
can potentially help to overcome these challenges, as it can provide
new cost-effective and efficient methods of delivering health care
across geographic distances. The full benefits and future potential of
telemedicine, however, are constrained by overlapping, inconsistent,
and inadequate legal and regulatory frameworks, as well as the reper-
toire of standards imposed by state governments and professional or-
ganizations. Proponents of these barriers claim that they are necessary
to protect public health and safety, and that the U.S. Constitution
gives states exclusive authority over health and safety concerns. This
Article argues that such barriers not only fail to advance these public
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policy goals, but are unconstitutional when they restrict the practice of
telemedicine across state and national borders. Furthermore, the in-
terstate and international nature of telemedicine calls for increasing
the centralized authority of the federal government; this position is
consistent with the U.S. Constitution and other governing principles.
Finally, this Article observes that the U.S. experience bears some sim-
ilarities to that of other nations, and represents a microcosm of the
international community's need and struggle to develop a uniform
telemedicine regime. Just as with state governments in the U.S., na-
tions are no longer able to view health care as a traditional domestic
concern and must consider nontraditional options to resolve the di-
lemmas of rising costs and discontent in the delivery of health care to
their people.
INTRODUCTION
"We are the only democracy-the only advanced democracy
on Earth - the only wealthy nation-that allows such hard-
ship for millions of its people."
-- Barack Obama
-- Remarks to Joint Session of Congress on Health Care
The hardship that the United States President Barack Obama
(President Obama) denounced in his address to a 2009 Joint Session
of Congress on Health Care is the plight of over thirty million U.S.
citizens who lack health care coverage. 2 In calling for health care re-
form, President Obama cited rising costs as one of the primary obsta-
cles. 3 His observation that the nation spends one and one half times
more per person on health care than any other country without any
resulting improvements4 is supported by the World Health Organiza-
tion's (WHO) dismal ranking of the nation at thirty-seventh among
191 member nations for health care system performance. Although
U.S. President Barak Obama, Remarks by the President to the Joint Ses-
sion of Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press office/remarks-by-the-president-to-a-joint-
session-of-congress-on-health-care/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
2 id.
3id.
4id.
Ajay Tandon et al., Measuring Overall Health System Performance For
191 Countries 18 (WHO, GPE Discussion Paper Series: No. 30), available at
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/paper30.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
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the WHO published these rankings in 2000,6 the U.S. continues to lag
behind its counterparts to the present day. In 2006, the U.S. ranked
thirty-ninth in infant mortality, forty-third for adult female mortality,
forty-second for adult male mortality, and thirty-sixth for life expec-
tancy.7 In a 2010 study of industrialized countries, the U.S. was last in
"quality, efficiency, access to care, equity and the ability to lead long,
healthy, productive lives."' The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's
2011 estimates affirm such a result, placing the U.S. forty-sixth for
infant mortality9 and fiftieth in life expectancy among other coun-
tries.o
This dilemma of rising costs and the corresponding lack of quality
and access to health care forces one to question whether this is an
avoidable and incongruous result, especially given recent advances in
technology and medical knowledge that have transformed the health
care industry. For instance, the development of electronic communica-
tions has enabled remote consultations and real-time examination,
treatment, and diagnosis of a patient's symptoms by a physician in a
different location." Hawaii is one of the few states that have taken
advantage of such innovations by permitting out-of-state licensed
physicians to engage in "actual consultation, including in-person,
mail, electronic, telephonic, fiber-optic, or other telemedicine consul-
tation. ... These advances in telecommunications, which represent
6 As of the writing of this Article, the WHO has yet to update these findings.
See Press Release, World Health Organization, World Health Organization Assesses
the World's Health Systems (June 21, 2000), available at http://www.who.int/inf-pr-
2000/en/pr2000-44.html.
Christopher J. L. Murray & Julio Frenk, Ranking 37th-Measuring the
Performance ofthe US. Health Care System, 362 NEw ENG. J. OF MED 98, 98 (2010).
8 Mary Mahon & Bethanne Fox, U.S. Ranks Last Among Seven Countries
on Health System Performance Based on Measures of Quality, Efficiency, Access,
Equity, and Healthy Lives, COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 23, 2010),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/News/News-Releases/2010/JunIUS-
Ranks-Last-Among-Seven-Countries.aspx. Six other countries in the 2010 Common-
weath Fund study include: Australia, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand, and United
Kingdom. Id.
9 The World Factbook Country Comparison: Infant Mortality Rate, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2091 rank.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2011).
10 The World Factbook Country Comparison: Life Expectancy at Birth,
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2011).
1 See Susan E. Volkert, Telemedicine: Rx for the Future of Health Care, 6
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 147, 153 (2000).
12 HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-2 (West 2010) (permitting a telemedicine excep-
tion provided out-of-state physician does "not open an office, or appoint a place to
meet patients in th[e] State, or receive calls within the limits of the State").
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a few of the innovative technologies in the emerging field of telemed-
icine, offer the capabilities to provide for health care delivery at re-
duced costs while maintaining or increasing the quality of treatment
and services.13 The existence and potential of telemedicine in helping
to resolve problems in the U.S. health care system and the tardy pro-
gress on legislative reform underscore the continuing importance of
examining the role telemedicine plays in improvements to health care
systems, not only that of the U.S. but those of all nations.
As the experience of the U.S. demonstrates, telemedicine remains
a timely and relevant topic. It continues to impact current political,
economic, and public policy concerns of quality and access to health
care discussed above. Earlier works address the ways in which tele-
medicine helps to resolve these longstanding concerns in the existing
U.S. and foreign health care systems.14 Such discussions involve sur-
mounting of barriers that prevent the full realization of the benefits of
telemedicine, which include differing standards and regulatory re-
gimes of sub-national and national governments.' 5 Because telemedi-
cine is by nature a cross-jurisdictional practice, several scholars and
medical professionals conclude that the establishment of a uniform set
of standards and regulations is necessary to realize telemedicine's full
potential.' 6 However, less attention has been given to the reasons for
why these barriers exist. This Article seeks to build upon the earlier
works and conclusions of these scholars, and go beyond the existing
analysis to specifically critique the long-held and fiercely defended
rationales for barriers to telemedicine. Part I discusses the crucial role
of telemedicine in health care reform, and offers the current U.S. sys-
tem as an instructive example of how telemedicine may address the
escalating healthcare crisis. Part II discusses the barriers to telemedi-
cine in the U.S., which have been largely created by individual states
with little or no involvement by the federal government. Part III ques-
'3 See Volkert, supra note 11, at 155.
14 See, e.g., John D. Blum, The Role of Law in Global E-Health: A Tool for
Development and Equity in a Digitally Divided World, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 85
(2002); P. Greg Gulick, E-Health and the Future of Medicine: The Economic, Legal,
Regulatory, Cultural, and Organizational Obstacles Facing Telemedicine and
Cybermedicine Programs, 12 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 351 (2002); Thomas R. McLean,
The Future of Telemedicine & Its Faustian Reliance on Regulatory Trade Barriers for
Protection, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 462-63 (2006); Kristen Rabe Smolensky, Tele-
medicine Reimbursement: Raising the Iron Triangle to a New Plateau, 13 HEALTH
MATRIx 371 (2003); see generally Amar Gupta & Michael McHugh, Keeping Up
with Industry Development in Telemedicine, in TELEMEDICINE FOR TRAUMA,
EMERGENCIES, AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT 373-388 (Rifat Latifi ed., 2010); Volkert,
supra note 11.
1s See Volkert, supra note 11, at 156.
6 See id at 158-59.
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tions the justifications for these barriers, and concludes that state au-
thority over the health care is unconstitutional. Building upon such a
conclusion, Part IV determines that the federal government has the
constitutional right to regulate health care. Part V offers proposals for
a national telemedicine regime, and Part VI examines the feasibility of
applying such proposals on a global scale.
I. THE ROLE OF TELEMEDICINE IN HEALTH CARE
REFORM
The WHO defines telemedicine as:
[t]he delivery of health care services, where distance is a criti-
cal factor, by health care professionals using information and
communications technologies for the exchange of valid in-
formation for diagnosis, treatment and prevention of diseases
and injuries, research and evaluation, and for the continuing
education of health care providers, all in the interest of ad-
vancing the health of individuals and their communities.'"
As the above definition indicates, telemedicine covers all areas
and practices of the health care industry.' 8 Current applications and
potential future uses of telemedicine hold the promise of reducing
health care costs, and increasing both quality and access to health care
services. As several scholars in this field maintain, the unrestricted
utilization of telemedicine has the capacity to play an instrumental
role in resolving current the health care crises that plague countries
such as the United States.'
A review of the rising costs and failings of the U.S. health care
system and the ways in which telemedicine resolves these problems
demonstrates the importance of telemedicine in reaching a solution.
First, health care spending in the U.S. is the highest among all the
most economically advanced countries. 20 A 2007 Congressional re-
port comparing the U.S. with member countries of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) concludes that
17 WORLD HEALTH ORG., INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF HEALTH
CARE 1, http://www.who.int/eht/en/InformationTech.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
18 See Volkert, supra note 11, at 152 ("Telemedicine providers are expanding
and cover the entire spectrum of health care practices, from cardiology to trauma
medicine, from dentistry to toxicology, and from gynecology to ophthalmology.").
19 See, e.g., Blum, supra note 14; Gulick, supra note 14, at 353; McLean,
supra note 14, at 443-45; Smolensky, supra note 14.
20 CHRIS L. PETERSON & RACHEL BURTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
34175, U.S. HEALTH CARE SPENDING: COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES 1
(2007).
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"there is no doubt that U.S. prices for medical care commodities and
services are significantly higher than in other countries and serve as a
key determinant of higher overall spending." 21 These prices have been
rising for several years.22 The total health expenditures equaled $2.3
trillion in 2008, which was 16.2 percent of the nation's Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP). 23 To put this in perspective, such expenditures
exceed spending on all other government services, including defense,
education, and pensions.24 This share of GDP increased from 15.9
percent in 2007.25 In comparison, health care spending amounted to
$714 billion in 1990 and $253 billion in 1980.26 Such costs increases
have made it difficult for governments, employers, and consumers to
afford health care services.27
Second, many individuals lack access to health care. These popu-
lations include those who require home health care, are confined to
correctional facilities, 28 and reside in rural communities.29 For exam-
ple, those residing in rural areas "have limited health care delivery
systems due to a scarcity of health care professionals, specialists, and
modern medical technology."30 Trauma centers are largely situated in
urban areas, thus rural residents incur great costs of travel and time to
seek medical attention.3' Furthermore, the scarcity of trauma centers
impacts the entire U.S. population regardless of residence: a 2007
21 Id. at 16 (quoting Elizabeth Docteur et al., The US Health System: An
Assessment and Prospective Directions for Reform 22-23 (OECD Econ. Dept., Work-
ing Paper No. 350), available at
http://www.oecdwash.org/PDFILES/us health ecowp350.pdf.).
22 U.S. Health Care Costs, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
http://www.kaiseredu.org/topicsim.asp?imlD=1&parentlD=61&id=358#1t (last
visited Jan. 15, 2010) (citing CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERv., DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. UPDATED NHE HISTORICAL PROJECTIONs (1965-2019),
available at
https://146.123.140.205/NationalHealthExpendData/03_NationalHealthAccountsProj
ected.asp).
. 23 National Health Expenditures 2009 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf (last
visited Mar. 31, 2011).
24 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CONSOLIDATED FEDERAL FUNDS REPORT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2008 xx (2009) http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/cffr-08.pdf.
25 National Health Expenditures 2009 Highlights, supra note 23.
26 U.S. Health Care Costs, supra note 22.
27 id.
28 Volkert, supra note 11, at 156.
29 Joy Elizabeth Matak, Telemedicine: Medical Treatment Via Telecommuni-
cations Will Save Lives, But Can Congress Answer the Call?, 22 VT. L. REV. 231, 236
(1997).
' Id. at 237.
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study found that over half of car accident deaths occur in rural areas
even though only approximately 25 percent of the U.S. population
lives in rural areas.32 This translates into car accident mortality rates
being twice as high in rural areas than in urban areas.3
Telemedicine offers the ability to reduce health care expenditures
and deliver health care to the above underserved populations by offer-
ing treatment at a distance. This form of "distance medicine" includes,
but is not limited to, use of the following applications: online commu-
nications between physician and patient; consultations via electronic
communications between patients' primary care physicians and ter-
tiary care specialists; and real-time examination, treatment, and diag-
nosis through interactive television and emergency centers where phy-
sicians remotely evaluate a patient's symptoms. 34 For example, web-
sites enabling patients at home to upload personal health data for re-
view by health professionals have resulted in huge cost savings and
shorter hospital stays.3 ' Additionally, the use of video-conferencing
by physicians to treat state prisoners has led to less travel time and
security risks.36 In particular, the Arizona Telemedicine Program,
which began in 1998, reported that its use of telemedicine in the
state's prisons lowered transportation costs by more than one million
dollars. 7
In addition to such existing capabilities, telemedicine has the po-
tential to further reduce costs, and facilitate greater access to and im-
prove the quality of health care in a variety of ways. One promising
development involves innovations in networking and communica-
tions.38 For example, advances in information technology (IT) securi-
ty will resolve current concerns about breaches in security and patient
privacy. 39 IT networks will transform the delivery of health care by
enabling secure cross-border transfers of confidential health infor-
mation, thus allowing greater opportunities to engage in interstate and
offshore delivery of telemedicine.40
32 R. Latifi et al., Telemedicine and Telepresence for Trauma and Emergency
Care Management, 96 SCANDINAVIAN J. OF SURGERY 281, 282 (2007).
33 id.
34 Volkert, supra note 11, at 153.
3 Gulick, supra note 14, at 358.
36 Volkert, supra note 11, at 156.
37 Kevin Blanchet, Innovative Programs in Telemedicine: The Arizona Tele-
medicine Program, 11 TELEMEDICINE & E-HEALTH 633, 639 (2005).
38 Amar Gupta, Prescription for Change, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2008, at R6.
39 id.
40 id.
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Another area of potential is the offshore outsourcing of diagnostic
services.4 1 Such an approach will improve the quality of health care
by re-distributing workloads and lowering costs. 4 2 An instructive ex-
ample is the area of teleradiology, as x-rays are increasingly taken in
one location and transmitted to another location for evaluation.43 This
arrangement helps to resolve the growing demand for teleradiology
services, thus lowering costs, and allowing for improved quality in
service by ensuring that alert radiologists will evaluate the images at
all hours."
Despite the above-demonstrated benefits of present and potential
uses of telemedicine, the subsequent sections of this Article will build
upon earlier scholarship to show that the U.S. and other nations are
impeding the full realization of these benefits by promulgating con-
flicting regulations and technical standards for the delivery of health
care. 45 To better understand the implications and consequences of
such impediments, an examination of the situation in the U.S. is in-
structive. Similar to the challenges telemedicine providers face in the
international community, telemedicine providers must comply with a
multitude of varying and often conflicting requirements imposed by
different states and professional organizations within the U.S. Analyz-
ing these challenges within the context of the U.S. enables one to
glean greater insight into how to find workable solutions to the unre-
stricted use of telemedicine on a global platform.
II. BARRIERS TO TELEMEDICINE IN THE UNITED
STATES
The present and potential uses of telemedicine are constrained by
overlapping and often inconsistent and inadequate regulatory frame-
works and technical standards imposed by governments and profes-46 to ildmntae hs
sional medical organizations. As this section will demonstrate, these
barriers raise transaction costs and prevent or impede patients from
receiving the best quality of care available. In the U.S., telemedicine
providers are subject to each state's differing regulations and stand-
ards. Many states have yet to address the interstate and global nature
of telemedicine, and inappropriately impose requirements tailored for
delivery and practice of health care on a local level. Furthermore, such
41 id.
42 id.
43 id.
44Id.
45 See, e.g., Gulick, supra note 14, at 378-79; McLean, supra note 14., at
461-63.
46 See Volkert, supra note 11, at 156-57.
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inability to recognize and resolve these new challenges is underscored
by the limited role the federal government currently plays in the area
of regulation of telemedicine. In the few areas where the federal gov-
ernment does regulate, it often does not pre-empt state power and al-
lows states to impose stricter standards.
The following categories of health regulation constitute the main
barriers that telemedicine faces: (1) licensing requirements, (2) medi-
cal malpractice coverage, (3) legal liability, (4) privacy of infor-
mation, and (5) payment of services. An examination of each of these
categories shows how overlapping, inconsistent, and inadequate obli-
gations imposed by governments and professional organizations im-
pede the practice and growth of telemedicine.
A. Licensing Requirements
Every state has the authority to regulate health professionals who
practice in their territories.4 7 Each state has its own version of a "Med-
ical Practice Act," created and enacted by that state's legislature, to
govern the practice of medicine. 4 8 These state statutes require a physi-
cian to be licensed in the state in which the physician is practicing
medicine. 49 These statutes also delegate regulatory authority to a state
medical board.50 The importance of locality in licensing is further
47 See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1889), where the Su-
preme Court held that a state's interest in protecting its citizens included the regula-
tion of medical licensure:
Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter
it than that of medicine... Every one may have occasion to consult [the
health professional], but comparatively few can judge of the qualifications
of learning and the skill which he possesses. Reliance must be placed upon
the assurance given by his license, issued by an authority competent to
judge in that respect, that he possesses the requisite qualifications.
48 The Role of the State Medical Board, FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS.,
http://www.fsmb.org/grpol talkingpointsl.htmi (last visited Jan. 8, 2010) [hereinafter
FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS.].
49 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §08.64.170; COLORADO REV. STAT. § 12-36-106
(2010); 24 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1702 (2008); FLA STAT. ANN. § 458.327 (West
2010); HAWAII REv. STAT. §453-2; IDAHO CODE §54-1804; KANSAS STAT. ANN. §65-
2803(West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1271 (2010); Miss. CODE ANN. §73-25-
1; NEv. REV. STAT. §630.160; 59 OKL. STAT. §§491, 492(C)(2)(b); S.C. CODE ANN. §
40-47-30 (2009). The number of categories of health professionals subject to regula-
tion is too large to warrant individual analysis for the purposes of this Article (e.g.,
nurses, dentists). In order to highlight common issues within an industry as diverse as
health care, this Article will only focus on a few examples. It should also be noted
that other parties in this industry, like hospitals, must undergo licensure/approval
requirements (e.g., hospitals), but these discussions are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle.
so FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 48.
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underscored in other aspects of these statutes, as they have significant
variations among them.5 ' These variations may include differences in
the following: definition of the practice of medicine; what constitutes
the unlawful practice of medicine; and licensure and re-registration
requirements. 52 Such state-specific requirements force a telemedicine
practitioner or provider to incur higher business costs to meet compli-
ance, as telemedicine is often and intended to be practiced across state
borders. These scenarios include: (1) physician and patient are located
in different states, (2) physician and patient are in same state but con-
sulting physician is out-of-state, or (3) patient, physician, and consult-
ing physician are in different states. Thus, the effect of compliance
with these varying state specific requirements is higher costs of con-
ducing interstate business and the creation of a monopoly for in-state
health care providers.5 4
Current measures to address telemedicine licensure offer no solu-
tion. A review of each of these measures will reveal their weaknesses.
First, a majority of states offer a consultation exception that allows
out-of-state licensed physicians to practice in very limited situations
without the particular state's license in question." This exception
allows out-of-state licensed physicians to consult on patients provided
that they work with or offer services at the request of an in-state phy-
sician.56 This exception, however, is not a successful strategy, as most
states require consultations to be infrequent or that the in-state physi-
cian or physicians make the final medical decision."
Second, many states have enacted laws regulating telemedicine li-
censure. Since 2006, twenty-four states require out-of-state physicians
to obtain a full license from the state in which the service is being
provided. A minority of states allow for reciprocity or endorse-
51 Id.
52 Id.
5 Volkert, supra note 11, at 168.
54 McLean, supra note 14, at 462; see also Matak, supra note 29, at 242
("Requiring teledoctors to obtain a license in every possible state to which they may
transmit treatment will inhibit the use of telemedicine since '[e]ach state's require-
ments are minutely different, and the expense and time involved in receiving licen-
sure . . . in more than one or two states makes it prohibitive, if not impossible, to
achieve' (quoting 104 CONG. REC. 141, 18185 (1995))).
5 Linda Gobis, An Overview of State Laws and Approaches to Minimize
Licensure Barriers, TELEMEDICINE TODAY, Dec. 1997, at 14, 15.
56 Id.
5 Laura Keidan Martin, Not So Fast, It's Regulated: Some Warnings for the
E-Health Biz, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 10, 10.
58 Law and Policy in Telemedicine: The State of Licensure in the US.,
TELEMEDICINE INFO. EXCH., http://tie.telemed.org/legal/state data.asp?type= icensure
(last updated Nov. 15, 2006) [hereinafter TELEMEDICINE INFO. ExcH.].
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ment.59 As of the writing of this Article, very few states allow out-of-
state physicians to practice medicine. 60 Examples of states in this mi-
nority category include Hawaii and Washington, which permit out-of-
state physicians to practice medicine provided they do not open an
office or designate a meeting place for patients or receive calls in-
state.6 Another potential outlier is California, as it has enacted legis-
lation giving the medical board authority to develop a registration
program to permit licensed out-of-state physicians to register with the
board to practice medicine, 62 but the board has yet to exercise that
authority. 63 Thus, by virtue of the variations in these state laws, such
measures to address telemedicine licensure fail to resolve the geo-
graphical limitations imposed by traditional licensure requirements.
Third, the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) proposed a
special purpose license in 1 9 9 6 .6 The FSMB is a national non-profit
association that represents seventy state medical licensing and disci-
plinary boards. 65 The special purpose license was created by FSMB as
part of its evaluation and recommendations for regulation of telemedi-
cine to state medical boards.66 This license is intended for physicians
who practice medicine across state lines by electronic or other
59 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-6-13 (LexisNexis 2008) (enabling licen-
sure by endorsement if physician meets its state-based Medical Practice Act require-
ments); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-4-19 (2010) (providing that reciprocity is available
if another state's or country's requirements are not less stringent); TENN. CODE ANN. §
63-6-211(a) (West 2010) (allowing reciprocity if another state's or country's require-
ments are not less stringent).
60 HAw. REV. STAT. § 453-2 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 18.71.030(6)
(2010).
61 Id.
62 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2052.5(a)(1) (West 2010).
63 See Practicing Medicine Through Telemedicine Technology, MED. BD. OF
CAL., http://www.medbd.ca.gov/licensee/telemedicine.html (last visited Jan. 12,
2011) ("California has no telemedicine registration program. In 1996, the Board
sought legislation to obtain the regulatory authority to develop a program for physi-
cians in other states to become registered in California, without requiring full licen-
sure. The legislation was unsuccessful in obtaining regulatory authority, and, instead,
added Section 2052.5 of the Business & Professions Code. This code has been the
source of some confusion, as it outlines the original proposal for the registration pro-
gram, but requires the Board to seek legislation to place a future program in statute.
Those unfamiliar with the law's history assume that the Board has a program or the
authority to implement one-the Board has neither.").
64 FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON
TELEMEDICINE FEDERATION OF THE STATE MEDICAL BOARDS OF THE UNITED STATES,
A MODEL ACT TO REGULATE THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE ACROSS STATE LINES (1996),
available at http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/l996 grpolTelemedicine.pdf [hereinafter
FSMB MODEL ACT].
FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 48.
66 FSMB MODEL ACT, supra note 64, § 1.
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means. License holders are subject to the jurisdiction of the medical
board in the state of issuance for all matters.6' Thus far, few states
have adopted this proposal. 69 This approach is unlikely to provide an
effective solution as each state still has the authority to determine its
own fees, and requirements and standards for issuance, thus resulting
in variations in state laws. 70 Although the FSMB offers guidelines, a
state's medical board has discretion to define what constitutes the
practice of medicine71 and to determine the grounds upon which to
grant or deny this license. 72 This cautious approach towards imple-
mentation and deference to state authority indicates that the FSMB
proposal primarily represents states' interests, and not necessarily
what is the most optimal approach in facilitating the practice of tele-
medicine. A comparison of the FSMB's proposal with that of other
nations in addressing the need for cross-border licensing of health
professionals affirms this observation. For example, unlike the
FSMB's state-by-state approval process, the European Union (EU)
requires its member states to grant legal effect to the diplomas of phy-
sicians obtained in other member states as long these diplomas meet
the minimum training requirements listed in the EU's "Doctor's Di-
rective 93/16."73 This Directive serves to satisfy the policy goals of
"full free movement" and "guarantee [ing] the quality of the entrants to
the profession."74
67 Id. § 4.
68 Id. § 6.
69 These states include: Alabama, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Neva-
da, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas. See TELEMEDICINE INFO. EXCH., supra note 58; see
also State Telemedicine Statute Summary, CTR. FOR TELEHEALTH AND E-HEALTH
LAW,
http://www.telehealthlawcenter.org/loadattachment.php?attachmentid=174_1744_327
(last visited Mar. 6, 2010) (summarizing state telemedicine licensure provisions in
select states).
70 See FSMB MODEL ACT, supra note 64, § 5. An example of variations in
state laws can be seen between Alabama and Minnesota. Alabama will only issue a
special license to those physicians located in states that allow Alabama-based physi-
cians to practice medicine across state lines, whereas Minnesota has no such require-
ment. ALA. ADMIN. CODE 540-X-16-.02 (7)(a); MINN. STAT. § 147.032 (2008).
71 FSMB MODEL ACT, supra note 64, § 8.
72 Id. § 5.
7 Council Directive 93/16/EEC, of the Council of the European Communi-
ties of 5 April 1993 to Facilitate the Free Movement of Doctors and the Mutual
Recognition of Their Diplomas, Certificates and Other Evidence of Formal Qualifica-
tions 93/16/EEC, (1993) O.J. (L 165) 1, 1-24.
74 M. Peeters, Free Movement of Medical Doctors in the EU, 26 MED. & L.
231, 235 (2007).
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B. Malpractice Insurance Coverage
In addition to local licensing requirements, telemedicine is limited
by difficulties in obtaining medical malpractice coverage. Telemedi-
cine insurers face the challenges of compliance with states' medical
malpractice insurance coverage requirements and legal liability in
different jurisdictions. Just as with the licensing process, states have
the authority to establish and regulate insurance for health care pro-
viders. The federal government has affirmed such delegation of state
76power through passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. A state's
insurance code essentially regulates every aspect of the health insur-
ance within its borders. 77 While there is overlap between state insur-
ance codes, each state has its own unique definitions, coverage
schemes, and procedures.78 Most require that a health professional
obtain medical malpractice coverage for a state's territory before re-
ceipt of medical license. 7 9 Such a requirement for state-specific cov-
erage for telemedicine providers who operate on an interstate platform
creates system inefficiencies that significantly increase transaction
costs.80 Such an assertion is supported by the findings of a 2004 report
sponsored by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC), which investigated the causes for the scarcity of national
insurers and the increased cost of coverage on a national basis."
Listed among the barriers to entering the medical malpractice market
are regulatory constraints, which bar "[m]ost medical malpractice
insurers [from] sell[ing] across state lines without filing for license or
7 See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 168, 183-84 (1869).
76 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1013 (2006). In Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, the
Fourth Circuit explained that the McCarran-Ferguson Act explicitly granted states the
authority to regulate the business of insurance and protected such authority from any
constitutional challenge based on the Commerce Clause to any state law (1) that "'re-
late[s] to the regulation of the business of insurance,"' or (2) "enacted 'for the pur-
pose of regulating the business of insurance."' 484 F.3d 284, 286, 287 (4th Cir. 2007)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012).
n See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-250 to -320 (West 2009).
78 See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 304.01; see generally Daniel Schwarcz,
Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study Of The British And Ameri-
can Approaches To Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TuL. L. REv. 735, 750 (2009)
(discussing the varying dispute resolution procedures for insurance coverage claims
among the states).
7 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §65-2809(c) (West 2010).
80 See Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Administrative Compensa-
tion for Medical Malpractice Injuries: Reconciling the Brave New World of Patient
Safety and the Torts System, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 73, 77 (2004).
81 ERIC NORDMAN ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE REPORT: A
STUDY OF MARKET CONDITIONS AND POTENTIAL SOLUIONS To THE RECENT CRISIS 6
(2004), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/topics medmal rptfinal.pdf.
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authorization. Rates and forms must be adjusted to local require-
ments." 82 Another cited barrier related to local-based regulation is the
lack of specialty market experience. For a potential insurer to enter a
new market, it must have "specialized and local knowledge" to suc-
cessfully underwrite, price, and defend claims.83 Given the require-
ments to comply with multiple insurance codes and local nuances,
state insurance laws have acted as longstanding barriers to the national
practice of telemedicine. 84
C. Legal Liability Considerations
The need to develop a standardized approach to obtaining medical
malpractice coverage further highlights related legal considerations a
telemedicine provider must address before doing business across state
borders. Jurisdiction and choice of law present new challenges in
malpractice adjudication, as telemedicine providers are often foreign
or based in a different state than the opposing party(ies). Jurisdiction
empowers a government to exercise authority over all persons and
property within its territory, including the power to prescribe, adjudi-
85
cate, and enforce judgments. Once jurisdiction is established, the
next issue to be resolved is which law applies to the case in question.
When parties are based in different states and countries, these other-
wise established rules of civil procedure become dilemmas. As an
examination of these legal issues for (1) U.S.-based providers and (2)
foreign-based providers operating in the U.S. demonstrate below, it is
crucial to consider uniform procedures and standards in dealing with
tort liability issues.
1. Legal Liability Considerations for U.S.-based Telemedicine
Providers
Currently, the dearth of case law and legislation on both federal
and state levels reveal much uncertainty and provide little guidance on
jurisdiction and choice of law determinations involving telemedicine
providers based in the U.S. 86 Several scholars anticipate jurisdiction in
82 Id. at 37.
83 Id.
84 See McLean, supra note 14, at 466.
85 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 401 (1987).
86 See generally Nathan Cortez, Patients Without Borders: The Emerging
Global Market for Patients and the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 IND. L.J. 71,
78 (2008); Deth Sao, David A. Gantz & Amar Gupta, Disputes Related to Healthcare
Across National Boundaries: The Potential for Arbitration, 42 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv. (forthcoming 2011).
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these situations will be established in accordance with the Supreme
Court's "minimum contacts" test of personal jurisdiction over inter-
state claims. 87 This test requires a finding of the following three ele-
ments: (1) the state has a long-arm statute allowing for personal juris-
diction; (2) the defendant has minimum contacts with the state, as
evidenced by foreseeability of liability and "purposeful availment" of
the privileges and protections of the laws of that state; and (3) the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and does not violate
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" guaranteed
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." The
Court has interpreted foreseeability to mean that a defendant expects
that its product will be purchased by the state's citizens." As to "pur-
poseful availment," the defendant must make a deliberate choice to
relate to the state in a meaningful way before being made to bear the
burden of defending there. 90 Notably, the defendant is not required to
have a physical presence in the state as long as the defendant's efforts
are directed towards the state.91 Finally, in considering whether per-
sonal jurisdiction is reasonable, the Court looks to the following fac-
tors: burden of litigation on defendant, interests of the forum state,
interests of the plaintiff, the interstate judicial system's interests in the
most efficient resolution, and shared states' interests in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies. 92
When applying the "minimum contacts" test to telemedicine, it
appears likely that interstate telemedicine providers will be subject to
8 See, e.g., Archie A. Alexander, III, American Diagnostic Radiology Moves
Offshore: Is this Field Riding "The Internet Wave" Into a Regulatory Abyss?, 20 J.L.
& HEALTH 199, 232-36 (2006-07); Mark S. Kopson, Medical Tourism: Implications
for Providers & Plans, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 147, 182-83 (2010); Thomas R.
McLean, The Offshoring of American Medicine: Scope, Economic Issues and Legal
Liabilities, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 205, 247 (2005); Lisa Rannefeld, The Doctor Will
Email You Now: Physicians' Use of Telemedicine to Treat Patients Over the Internet,
19 J.L. & HEALTH 75, 90 (2004-05).
88 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-78 (1985); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-98 (1980) (citing Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 251-53 (1958).
89 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 295-98 (finding no foreseea-
bility because the plaintiff purchased defendant dealer's car in a state other than fo-
rum state, and defendant had no knowledge plaintiff would be using car to travel to
forum state).
90 Id. at 295 (finding no purposeful availment because defendant dealer did
not sell cars, advertise, or cultivate customer base in forum state).
91 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777, 781 (1984) (finding
defendant purposefully availed itself of chance to engage in in-state activities by
distributing magazines in state).
92 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292.
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jurisdiction of the state in which they provide medical treatment
and/or services. First, most states have long-arm statutes allowing for
personal jurisdiction.93 Second, the interstate nature of telemedicine
compels a provider to acknowledge foreseeability of suit in any state
in which that provider does business. Furthermore, a telemedicine
provider also purposefully avails itself of the benefits and protections
of the forum state by engaging in commerce in that state.
On the other hand, the "minimum contacts" test reveals that the
state's assertion of personal jurisdiction in this context may be invalid.
It is questionable whether the last requirement that personal jurisdic-
tion be reasonable will be met. Given the above-listed factors the
Court considers to evaluate this requirement, it is debatable whether
an individual state's judicial system is an appropriate forum to adjudi-
cate an issue that involves parties, transactions, and public policy con-
cerns on such comprehensive national and global levels. These con-
cerns go the heart of the Court's considerations of the interstate judi-
cial system's interests in the most efficient resolution and the shared
states' interests in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
According to the Court, these considerations promote the principles of
interstate federalism, which is paramount to all other elements of the
test:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconven-
ience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of an-
other State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in ap-
plying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the
most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process
Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
9 See, e.g., ALA.CODE § 8-19C-10 (LexisNexis 2009); ALASKA STAT. §
09.05.015 (2010); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-1221 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-4-
101 (2010); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2010); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-1-
124 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-10loo (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
48.193 (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-209 (West 2010); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.2 10 (West 2009); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13:3201 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 704-A (2010); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 223A § 2 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.701, .711, .721 (West
2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-536 (Lexis Nexis 2010); NEV. STAT. ANN. §
14.065 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (West 2010); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302
(McKINNEY 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.382 (West 2010); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (West 2010); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 9-5-33 (West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-7-2 (2010); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 20-2-214 (West 2010); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon
2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-205 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1
(2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185 (2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.05 (West
2008).
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sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment. 94
Here, it is doubtful whether adjudicating an interstate telemedi-
cine claim in one forum state is the most efficient resolution to the
interstate judicial systems' best interests or advances the states' social
policies. For example, telemedicine implicates health and safety
standards and regulations of more than one state, which are issues that
a forum state is arguably not qualified to unilaterally adjudicate. This
is especially true when the forum state will likely apply its own laws
for cases involving tort liability. 9 Furthermore, telemedicine is an
unsettled and ambiguous area of legal liability. The standard of care
for online treatment by physicians in a medical malpractice case is
still undefined by many states. 96 Thus, given these concerns, it is
worth considering a national forum for adjudication as an alternative
to state courts.
2. Liability Considerations for Foreign-based Telemedicine Providers
Just as with U.S.-based telemedicine providers, there is little
guidance on jurisdiction and choice of law determinations for foreign-
based telemedicine providers. While the Supreme Court has applied
the "minimum contacts" test to determine personal jurisdiction over
alien defendants, the same uncertainties voiced above regarding the
validity of such an assertion apply here. The requirement that personal
jurisdiction not violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" is extended in the international context in the following ways.
First, the Court's consideration of collective U.S. states' interests
"calls for a court to consider the procedural and substantive polices of
other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of [the ju-
risdiction of a state court] ." Second, the federal government's inter-
est in its foreign policies will also play a factor.99 Third, the interests
of the defendant have "significant weight in assessing the reasonable-
94 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denck-
la, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 254 (1958)).
95 See Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 443 (N.Y. 1961); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971) ("The rights and liabilities of the
parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state . .
96 Some states follow the FSMB's view that online treatment warrants the
same standard of care as in-person treatment, and that sole use of an online question-
naire is unacceptable. FSMB MODEL ACT, supra note 64, §3.
97 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
9 Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
99 Id
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ness of stretching the long arm of the personal jurisdiction over na-
tional borders," as "unique burdens [are] placed upon one who must
defend oneself in a foreign legal system."' 00
Here, the global nature of the telemedicine industry necessarily
involves other nations' interests and foreign policy implications for
the federal government. Thus, the Court's reluctance to apply a bright
line rule of jurisdiction over foreign defendants and its expressed de-
sire to honor the interests of the federal government and other nations
lends support to the need for an inclusive global framework for de-
termining such international rules of civil procedure. A review of ex-
isting international legal mechanisms to address the practice of tele-
medicine underscores this need. As of the writing of this Article, there
are no international agreements concerning telemedicine. o There are
notable exceptions where telemedicine law has become more fully
developed and comprehensive, such as Malaysia.102 Overall, however,
telemedicine providers who engage in business in the U.S. and the
global marketplace face significant uncertainty as to the scope and
extent of their exposure to legal liability.
D. Privacy of Information
Unlike the ambiguities of telemedicine law, there are layers of
regulation at both the federal and state levels for privacy protection of
health care information in the United States.
At the federal level, the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) imposes an obligation to maintain the
confidentiality of individually identifiable health information on
health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers that
transmit health information electronically.' 03 HIPAA applies to health
information via electronic media in connection with most financial
and administrative transactions.' Unauthorized disclosures may re-
sult in criminal and civil penalties.0 "
'00 Id.at 14.
101 See, e.g., Blum, supra note 14, at 85; Leah B. Mendelsohn, A Piece of the
Puzzle: Telemedicine as an Instrument to Facilitate the Improvement of Healthcare in
Developing Countries?, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 151, 153 (2004).
02 See infra Part V.
03 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2006).
104 Mary Beth Johnston, HIPAA Administrative Simplification Privacy, Secu-
rity, and Transaction Standards, 2 HEALTH LAW. 9, 9 (2002) ("The HIPAA transac-
tion standards and requirements apply, unless otherwise specified, to health plans,
health care clearinghouses, and any health care provider that transmits or maintains
any health information via electronic media in connection with a covered transaction.
Covered transactions include, among others, health claims or equivalent encounter
information, health claims attachments, enrollment and disenrollment in a health plan,
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HIPAA requires states to follow the federal standards it sets forth,
but it allows states and other federal agencies to set forth and impose
stricter security measures.' 06 Such overlapping regulations force tel-
emedicine providers to comply with both federal and state standards, a
process that is expensive, difficult, and time-consuming.107 Further-
more, the telemedicine provider faces additional costs of compliance
where state laws are more stringent. Examples of such state laws in-
clude: granting a person greater rights to see, copy, or amend his or
own health information; increasing privacy protections afforded by
authorization; and providing greater privacy protection for the person
who is the subject of the individually identifiable health infor-
mation. 08
E. Payment for Telemedicine Services
In addition to the above-listed obstacles, the practice of telemedi-
cine is impeded by the health care reimbursement process in the Unit-
ed States. The three main health care insurers, Medicare, Medicaid,
and private entities, do not pay for telemedicine services or only pay
for some services under limited circumstances. 109 A review of each of
these insurers will show the ways in which current billing processes
impede the practice of telemedicine.
eligibility for a health plan, health care payment and remittance advice, health plan
premium payments, first report of injury, health claim status, and referral certification
and authorization"); see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(a)(2) (2006); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103
(2009).
10s 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b).
1o6 § 1320d-7(a).
107 The American Health Information Management Association, a nonprofit
association of health information professionals, published an advisory article to busi-
nesses interested in HIPPAA compliance that provided the following price estimates
of the process: from approximately $500 for a single state study conducted by that
state's bar to $5,000-$10,000 by another entity for a single state's analysis, depend-
ing on the complexity of the state's laws. Joy Pritts, Preemption Analysis Under
HIPAA-Proceed with Caution, 11 IN CONFIDENCE 4 (2003), available at
http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok3005197.hcsp?d
DocName=bok3 005197#sidebar.
1s Id.
109 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., 2001 TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO
CONGRESS 1 (2001), available at ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/telehealth/report2001.pdf [herein-
after 2001 TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS].
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1. Medicare
Medicare, a federal insurer for the aged and disabled,"o has geo-
graphic and services limitations for reimbursement. Eligible services
include "office and other outpatient visits, professional consultation,
psychiatric diagnostic interview examination, individual psychothera-
py, pharmacologic management, end-stage renal disease-related ser-
vices included in the monthly capitation payment (except for one visit
per month to examine the access site), individual medical nutrition
therapy, the neurobehavioral status exam, and follow-up telehealth
consultations furnished by an interactive telecommunications sys-
tem.""' Excluded services that "do not meet the definition of an inter-
active telecommunications system" are "[tielephones, facsimile ma-
chines, and electronic mail systems."" 2 Geographically, reimburse-
ment is limited to an originating site. The Code of Federal Regulations
defines an originating site as "the site where the patient is located [,
which] must be the office of a physician or practitioner, a critical ac-
cess hospital, a rural health clinic, a federally qualified health center,
or a hospital."l" 3 These sites must be a Rural Health Professional
Shortage Area, a non-Metropolitan Statistical Area, or part of a feder-
al telemedicine project.114 Furthermore, home health care requires
face-to-face visits and telemedicine may not be substituted in place of
these visits.''"
2. Medicaid
Medicaid, a federal insurer of low-income and disabled popula-
tions, further complicates the billing process by allowing states to run
their own Medicaid programs." 6 This means that each state deter-
mines which telemedicine services, if any, are eligible for reimburse-
"o See Medicare Eligibility Tool, MEDICARE.GOV,
http://www.medicare.gov/MedicareEligibility/Home.asp?dest-NAVHome|GeneralEn
rollment#TabTop (follow "What is Medicare?" hyperlink) (last updated Sept. 17,
2008).
"' 42 C.F.R. § 410.78(b) (2009).
112 § 410.78(a)(3).
" § 410.78(b)(3).
114 2001 TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 109, at 17-18.
" Telemedicine and Telehealth, CTRS. FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE SERVS.,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Telemedicine/ (last
visited Jan. 10, 2009).
116 Medicaid Program-General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICAID &
MEDICARE SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidGenlnfo/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
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ment.117 Currently, only eighteen states compensate for telemedicine
services, while two others are developing plans to cover telemedi-
*118
cine.
3. Private Insurers
In general, private insurers rarely compensate for telemedicine
services."l 9 A combination of doubt regarding telemedicine's efficacy
and concerns with costs of and compliance with states' regulatory
insurance requirements are likely responsible for denial of cover-
age. 120 In instances where insurers do provide coverage, intrastate
services are more likely to be covered than interstate services because
of the premium differentials among states.121 Only recently have some
- - 122
private insurers begun to provide limited telemedicine coverage.
One of the main reasons for this change in policy is because some
states have begun to require private insurers to provide reimburse-
ment.123 While there is some movement towards coverage, such
overwhelming reluctance contributes to the difficulties faced by tele-
medicine practitioners in treating their patients.
III. THE (IL)LEGITIMACY OF STATE AUTHORITY
OVER POLICE POWERS IN TELEMEDICINE
As the above section demonstrates, the existing state-by-state reg-
ulatory framework is ill equipped to resolve the challenges of the
health care industry on a national and global scale. The effects of the
aforementioned barriers prompt a consideration of national and inter-
national alternatives to establish standards and regulations involving
out-of-state parties and transactions. In justifying the need for these
'" See Telemedicine and Telehealth Funding, TELEMEDICINE INFO. EXCH.,
http://tie.telemed.org/funding/default.asp?return=record&type-program&genus=Fede
ral&id=21 (last updated Nov. 1, 2005).
118 Id. The following states provide for telemedicine reimbursement: Arkan-
sas, California, Georgia, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West
Virginia. States that are in the process of incorporating telemedicine services in their
plan include: Kentucky and Maine. Id.
"9 Alissa R. Spielberg, Online Without a Net: Physician-Patient Communica-
tion by Electronic Mail, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 267, 290 (1999) (explaining that private
insurers doubt that telemedicine is a "cost-effective and reliable therapeutic modality
that deserves reimbursement . . .
120 See id.
121 Rannefeld, supra note 87, at 91.
122 See 2001 Telemedicine Report to Congress, supra note 109, at 19.
123 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-123(2) (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22:1821(F) (2009).
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alternatives, it is first necessary to demonstrate the following: (1) the
reasons behind the traditional belief that local authorities are in the
best position to police the health care industry 124 are no longer valid
in the context of telemedicine; (2) the existing state system is not the
best solution available, as national standards and regulations for health
and safety are currently in place for other aspects of public health and
safety; (3) because of these two reasons, in addition to the interstate
commercial nature of telemedicine, the state does not have exclusive
constitutional authority over health regulation; and (4) for these same
reasons, state regulation of telemedicine is unconstitutional. This sec-
tion will argue each of these assertions in turn below.
A. State Regulation of Health Care Is a Result of Historic and
Political Realities, Not Because Health Care is an Intrinsically
Local Concern
Proponents of the state policing system maintain that issues sur-
rounding health and safety are inherently local in nature, and thus
warrant local control. 125 Because health and safety issues have "local
peculiarities," the state is most qualified to tailor a solution for its
citizenry. 126 In the context of health care, this point of view is valid
from a historical perspective. Until recently, health care was only
practiced at a local level and limited to parties and transactions within
a state's territory. 127 But this point of view is no longer valid. As this
Article has demonstrated, recent advancements in technology and
medical knowledge enabled health care to transcend state borders,
thus no longer making health care a local activity and by extension, an
exclusive local concern.
To demonstrate that health care is not an intrinsically local con-
cern, it is instructive to examine the historical development of state
power over health care regulation in the United States. Such an exam-
ination will show that, rather than resulting from immovable "local
peculiarities" of a community, state regulation arose and expanded in
response to the prevailing medical knowledge and technology at the
time.
124 See Volkert, supra note 11, at 179-80 ("States have historically done an
excellent job at policing, and there is no data to suggest a national system would work
as well as the existing state systems.").
125 See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the
Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 149, 156-157 (2004).
126 Id. at 156.
127 Thomas R. McLean, The Global Market for Health Care: Economics and
Regulation, 26 WIs INT'L L.J. 591, 591, 625 (2008).
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1. Colonial Period: Health Care Regulation Limited to Infectious
Disease Control
In colonial times, the regulation of health care became a province
of the states because it was "a rational response to the technological
level of the eighteenth century . . ." The prevalence and reoccur-
rence of infectious disease in colonies and the available medical
knowledge and technologies to combat such diseases in colonies
helped dictate the distribution of powers between states and the feder-
al government.129 Because of these circumstances:
[t]he regulation of health care was, of practical necessity, a
municipal function during the Colonial period, remaining so
during the first century of the Republic. . .. [M]unicipal regu-
lation of health care was a reflection of the era, rather than an
immutable Constitutional principle of federalism . . 30
From these circumstances arose the beginnings of state regulation
in health care, as medical knowledge at the time dictated that states
were in the best position to monitor and control infectious disease
outbreaks. 131 As most citizens in the colonies lived near rivers, they
were vulnerable to mosquito-borne diseases such as malaria and yel-
low fever. 132 Because these diseases were transmitted face-to-face or
via local contact, a local response was required. 33 To prevent conta-
gion and infection, local authorities implemented quarantine measures
as a solution.'34 These outbreaks occurred and solutions were applied
at such a localized level that the first regulatory efforts were mainly
municipal initiatives.'35 The first boards of health were also munici-
pal. 136 The first hospital was established by the city of Philadelphia.13 7
Thus, just as with the federal government, states played no role in
health care during the nation's early formative years.
128 Kevin Outterson, Health Care, Technology and Federalism, 103 W. VA. L.
REv. 503, 504 (2001).
129 Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical
Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of
Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALs HEALTH L.
201,203 (1999).
130 Outterson, supra note 128, at 515.
131 id.
132 Richards, supra note 129, at 203-05.
133 Outterson, supra note 128, at 506.
134 See Richards, supra note 129, at 205.
135 See Outterson, supra note 128, at 506.
136 Id. at 507.
'31 Id. at 506-07.
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At the same time that available medical knowledge dictated that
states regulate infectious diseases, the lack of medical knowledge in
other areas of health prevented states from regulating the practice of
medicine.'38 During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, medi-
cal treatment made no significant difference in a person's survival.139
Widely practiced treatments were more harmful than beneficial, and
included the following: purges, bleeding, and unsanitary habits by
physicians who spread germs by contact.140 Because of such ineffec-
tiveness, "in the minds of the populace and the legislatures, there was
no justification for setting some physicians up with a state-enforced
monopoly through licensing them, and excluding other physicians."'41
It is important to note here another theory for why states did not
regulate the practice of medicine at this time, as it lends further sup-
port to the argument that health care is determined by political con-
cems rather than "local peculiarities." Legal scholar Kevin Outterson
observes that such lack of regulation reflected the political views of
the Revolution and Jacksonian era, which opposed the British practice
of granting monopolies by requiring licensures of professionals.142
2. Post-Civil War Period: Expansion of Health Care Regulation
By 1880, advances in medical knowledge and technology trig-
gered state involvement in health care regulation. Developments in
science finally reached the point where medical treatments began to
be effective.143 Discoveries such as anesthesia and modem germ theo-
ry enabled physicians to provide successful treatments and cures.
Gains in medical knowledge, like these, also offered a basis on which
to set standards for health professionals and types of treatment,14 5
which prompted the formation of state medical boards and their peti-
tioning of states for stricter licensing laws.146 Thus, the evolution from
municipal to state regulation in response to advances in technology
and medical knowledge shows that expansion of jurisdiction in this
area has already occurred. That these advances are embodied in the
form of telemedicine indicate the need for a further expansion on na-
tional and international scales.
"'Id. at 515.
139 Richards, supra note 129, at 206.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 207.
142 Outterson, supra note 128, at 511.
143 Richards, supra note 129, at 209.
'" Id. at 209-10.
145 Outterson, supra note 128, at 512.
146 id
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B. National Regulation of Health and Safety: Lessons from the
Federal Drug Agency
In addition to the historical evolution of state regulation over
health care, the development of the Federal Drug Agency (FDA) also
lends support to the proposition that an overarching layer of govern-
ance is required when health and safety concerns involve interstate
parties and transactions. The FDA is a prime example of such a na-
tional policing system because it is a federal consumer protection
agency charged with protecting the public health by regulating the
safety and efficacy of drugs and medical devices.147 Just as with this
Article's section on the growth of state regulation of health care, this
section will show that the establishment and expansion of the FDA's
responsibilities was also a response to developments in technology
and medical knowledge. Furthermore, this section will show that na-
tional regulation promulgated by the FDA was the appropriate re-
sponse, as the relevant health and safety concerns involved popula-
tions across state borders, and not just citizens within a particular ter-
ritory.
1. The Establishment of the FDA: The Pure Foods and Drug Act
The interstate sale of drugs prompted the Congressional enact-
ment of the Pure Foods and Drug Act in 1906 (Food and Drug Act),
which was the first attempt towards national regulation of drugs. 14 8
Congress granted such regulatory power to the FDA,149 which origi-
nally began as the Chemical Division of the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) in 1862.50 Through the Food and Drug Act,
the FDA was established as a federal agency with a mission of con-
sumer protection. To carry out such a goal, the "FDA developed a
regulatory model based on frequent seizures and criminal prosecutions
of adulterated products."152 The reach of the FDA authority extended
only to banning "adulterated" and "misbranded" foods and drugs that
were placed in interstate commerce. 1 5 Such authority was further
bounded by the absence of any requirement that these regulated prod-
147 Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Pre-
scription Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort
Reform, 48 RUTGERS. L. REV. 883, 886 (1996).
148 Id. at 890.
149 James Robert Dean, Jr., FDA at War: Securing the Food that Secured
Victory, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 461 (1998).
soId. at 455.
s Id. at 46 1.
152 Id. at 456.
15 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 147, at 892.
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ucts be tested or approved for safety before being marketed.15 4 Final-
ly, the FDA had no authority over medical devices.' 55 Few such in-
struments existed during this time,' 56 and thus likely had too little an
impact on interstate commerce and citizens' health and safety to war-
rant federal attention.
2. The Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938
The emergence and interstate sale of dubious medical devices and
widespread injuries and deaths resulting from untested drugs prompt-
ed Congress to expand the limited powers of the FDA under the Fed-
eral Food Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938 (1938 Act). In 1937, over
100 people died and others were severely injured by the drug Elixer
Sulfanilamide, which was never tested for safety before entering the
market.'1 7 This prompted a public outcry for reform of federal drug
laws.' 58 Furthermore, so-called "quack" devices were being sold to
consumers that posed health risks to consumers.159 For example, in
the 1940s, ninety dollar lamps were marketed as cure-alls for diseases
such as diabetes, cancer, tuberculosis, and syphilis.160
Such harmful impacts on consumers' health and pocketbooks
prompted the enactment of the 1938 Act.' 6' To address drug safety
concerns, the 1938 Act required all new drugs to undergo testing by
the manufacturer and FDA safety review prior to sale. 162 For medical
devices, the FDA had new authority to ban devices entering interstate
commerce, impose labeling requirements,16 3 and seize misbranded
and fraudulent devices.'6I Significantly, the FDA gained greater pow-
er under the 1938 Act's transformation of the agency into an adminis-
114 Id. at 891-92.
155 Id.
156 See MICHELE SCHOONMAKER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE U.S.
APPROVAL PROCESS FOR MEDICAL DEVICES:LEGISLATIVE ISSUES AND COMPARISON
WITH THE DRUG MODEL 7 (2005), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL3282603232005.
pdf.
15 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 147, at 893.
158 Id.
15 S. REP. No. 94-33, at 3 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070,
1072-73 (detailing Congress's concerns about "quack" medical devices).
160 id.
161 Id. at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N at 1075. The 1938 Act's effective
date was delayed by statute until July 1, 1940. See Act of June 23, 1939, Pub. L. No.
76-151,53 Stat. 853.
162 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 147, at 894.
161 Id. at 895.
' Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938).
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trative authority. The 1938 Act "provided for the replacement of a
traditional police force with an independent regulatory body empow-
ered to create and enforce the law."' 65 The scope of such authority
ranged from the beginning of the regulated product's development
(e.g., factory inspections where products are made) to the procurement
of injunctions in federal courts and pursuit of criminal prosecutions of
violators.'6 6 Finally, the FDA's transfer from the USDA to the Federal
Security Agency in 1940 affirmed its mandate as a national regulator
of health and safety issues. In approving such a transfer, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote in his 1939 Reorganizational Plan that it
was "necessary and desirable to group in a Federal Security Agency
those agencies of the Government, the major purposes of which are to
promote social and economic security, educational opportunity and
the health of the citizens of the Nation." 167
3. The 1962 Amendments
In addition to developments in drugs and medical devices in the
United States, the power of the FDA was also influenced by such de-
velopments abroad. In Europe, the drug Thalidomide, which was used
to relieve morning sickness in pregnant women, was discovered to
cause serious birth defects.' 68 While this drug was popular in Europe,
it was never approved for U.S. use. However, this incident "provided
the single most visible justification for increasing the power of the
FDA to regulate drugs."1 69 U.S. residents' fears of this incident occur-
ring domestically thus "framed the FDA policy toward review of
drugs approved for use outside the United States." 70 In response,
Congress enacted the 1962 Amendments, which expanded FDA pow-
er to include: (1) determining that a drug was safe before sale, (2)
determining whether new drugs did what they proposed to do, and (3)
providing approval for clinical testing in humans. 171
165 Dean, supra note 149, at 457.
166 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 147, at 895-96.
167 The President Presents Plan No. I to Carry Out the Provisions of the Reor-
ganization Act (Apr. 24, 1939) at 252, available at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/pdf/fdr.pdf.
168 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 147, at 896.
169 Id. at 896 n.37.
170 Id. (quoting Joseph Contrera, The Food and Drug Administration and the
International Conference on Harmonization: How Harmonious Will International
Pharmaceutical Regulations Become?, 8 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 927, 936 (1994)).
171 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 147, at 897. The 1962 Amendments were also
motivated by widespread complaints of deceptive advertising by drug manufacturers.
To address this problem, the Amendments granted the FDA authority over: (1) drug
advertising and promotional activities, (2) inspections of drug manufacturing facili-
2011] 411
HEAL TH MA TRIX
4. The Medical Devices Amendments of 1976
While the aforementioned legislation provided the FDA even
greater authority in response to interstate and global health and safety
concerns, it was not until the passage of the Medical Device Amend-
ments of 1976 (MDA) that "the FDA achieved jurisdiction over nearly
every commercial implement or substance used in the treatment or
diagnosis of disease." 72 Just as with past legislation, the MDA was
enacted in response to technological developments in the medical
field. In the 1960s, newly invented medical devices such as heart
pacemakers and kidney dialysis units were introduced. 173 Widespread
reports of injuries and death resulting from use of these devices
prompted Congress to fill gaps in existing FDA regulation, 174 thereby
making devices subject to the same pre-approval process applied to
drugs. 175 Furthermore, given the wide scope and seriousness of the
health and safety concerns involved, Congress sought to ensure that
the FDA's medical regulations would pre-empt any conflicting state
regulations by including the following express pre-emption clause in
the MDA:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or
continue in effect any requirement with respect to a medical
device intended for human use having the force and effect of
law (whether established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or
court decision), which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable to such device under any provision of
the act and which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the
device or to any other matter included in a requirement appli-
cable to the device under the act.176
Thus, as both the historical development of state regulation and
the FDA authority demonstrate, the expansion and uniformity of regu-
lation is required to ensure that new technologies and knowledge in
the health care industry are safely distributed to the public.
ties, (3) establishing manufacturing practices, and (4) removal of drugs from market
in event of regulatory violation. Id. at 901.
172 Id. at 903.
173 S. REP. No. 94-33, at 5 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070,
1074.
174 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 147, at 903; see also id at 6-7, reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N at 1076 (describing the results of a 1970 study that revealed
10,000 injuries due to medical devices and the resulting public opinion regarding
medical device legislation).
175 SCHOONMAKER, supra note 156, at 7.
17' 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1994).
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C. States Do Not Have the Constitutional Right to Exclusive Domain
Over Health Regulation
Because there are no "local peculiarities" in the delivery of health
care with respect to telemedicine and the FDA provides a real-world
example of a workable and successful alternative to state regulation,
there exists no justifiable basis for a state policing system for telemed-
icine. These observations further support the following assertion that a
state has no constitutional basis to claim exclusive authority over
health regulation.
Many proponents of a state policing system claim that the federal
government is constitutionally barred from health regulation, as police
powers are the exclusive domain of states under the Tenth Amend-
ment. The FSMB, mentioned earlier as the representative voice of
state medical licensing boards,177 asserts that "[u]nder the 10 th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, states have the authority to
regulate the activities that affect health, safety, and welfare of their
citizens."1 While the Tenth Amendment does not explicitly state that
health care is an enumerated state power, such power is ostensibly
rooted in the following language of the Amendment: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple." 79 In U.S. Supreme Court decisions, these powers have been
interpreted to mean "police" powers that were best exercised locally
by a state in order to protect its citizens' public health, safety and wel-
fare.' 80
Indeed, the history of legal challenges to the police power and
health care regulation has resulted in overwhelming support for state
authority.' 81 Notwithstanding such support, the Court rejects the view
177 FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 48.
178 id
' U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
180 See Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (defining police
powers of the states under the Tenth Amendment to include an "immense mass of
legislation, which embraces everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered
to the general government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the
States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description,
as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State.... ").
18 See, e.g., Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608
(1935) (holding that a state has discretion to regulate the practice of dentistry);
McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344 (1917) (upholding state regulation defeating
ophthalmologist on a Fourteenth Amendment claim); Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S.
173 (1910) (holding that a state statute barring practice of medicine without state
registration does not violate Fourteenth Amendment); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding state law allowing boards of health to require mandatory
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that the Tenth Amendment grants states exclusive authority over po-
lice powers. The Court has historically upheld federal measures in
areas traditionally regarded as responsibilities of the states in instanc-
es where Congress has the concurrent right to regulate under its enu-
merated constitutional powers. In its 1919 Hamilton v. Kentucky Dis-
tilleries decision, the Court upheld the federal War-Time Prohibition
Act, which was challenged under Tenth Amendment grounds because
its ban on sale of liquor contravened the state police power to regulate
liquor traffic.182 In reaching its conclusion, the Court explained:
[t]hat the United States lacks the police power, and that this
was reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment, is true.
But it is none the less true that when the United States exerts
any of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, no
valid objection can be based upon the fact that such exercise
may be attended by the same incidents which attend the exer-
cise by a state of its police power, or that it may tend to ac-
complish a similar purpose.183
Even though the War-Time Prohibition Act interfered with a state
police power, it was valid because Congress's implied war powers
under, Article I, § 8, clause 18 of the Constitution, authorized Con-
gress "to 'make all laws . . . necessary and proper for carrying into
execution' the war powers expressly granted."I 84 Such reasoning was
also applied to uphold the federal Labor Standards Act of 1938 in
United States v. Darby, which contravened traditional state authority
over labor relations by banning the shipment of interstate commerce
of goods made by employees paid less than minimum wage.s18 Mir-
roring the reasoning in Hamilton, the Darby Court observed:
small pox vaccinations); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (determining that
state had broad discretion in describing qualifications necessary to practice medicine
in state); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (holding that under the police
power, a state can impose regulation for the general welfare even if it prevents a
person from practicing his profession).
182 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 153-
54, 156 (1919).
18 Id. at 156.
184 Id. at 155 (citation omitted) (noting that federal legislation was a justifia-
ble contravention of state police power authority because it advanced the war powers
in "guard[ing] and promot[ing] the efficiency of the men composing the army and the
navy and of the workers engaged in supplying them with arms, munitions, transporta-
tion and supplies.").
185 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941).
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The power of Congress over interstate commerce 'is complete
in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowl-
edges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitu-
tion.' That power can neither be enlarged nor diminished by
the exercise or non-exercise of state power. . . . It is no objec-
tion to the assertion of the power to regulate interstate com-
merce that its exercise is attended by the same incidents
which attended the exercise of the police power of the
states. . . . Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth
Amendment which . . . states but a truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered. 186
In the context of health regulation, this basis for federal interfer-
ence was applied by the District Court of Delaware in Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association v. Food and Drug Administration, and
was subsequently affirmed by the Third Circuit.' In upholding a
FDA regulation requiring that patients receive certain information for
drugs containing estrogen, the District Court of Delaware reasoned:
To the extent that the plaintiffs' claim of unconstitutional in-
terference with the right to practice medicine is founded on a
notion of federalism which reserves all rights over such regu-
lation to the states, it is without merit. It is undisputed that the
practice of medicine is subject to the exercise of state police
power where such regulation furthers a legitimate state inter-
est. But that assumption does not imply an absence of federal
jurisdiction over the same area, where the federal regulation
constitutes a reasonable exercise of a power vested in Con-
gress under the Constitution.
Thus, given such history of legal validity of federal police power
concurrent with state police power, the claim that states have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over health concerns is rendered invalid.
86 Id. at 114, 123, 124 (citation omitted); see also Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 492 (1957) (upholding federal law banning the mailing of obscene matter);
Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414, 424 (1926) (upholding federal law regulat-
ing tick-infected cattle); Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1925) (up-
holding federal law regulating stolen automobiles); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S.
308, 323 (1913) (upholding federal law banning interstate transportation of women
for immoral purposes); Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 363-64
(1903) (upholding federal law penalizing the interstate transportation of lottery tick-
ets).
187 Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. FDA, 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1187-88 (D. Del), affd
634 F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1980).
88 Id. at 1187 (citation omitted).
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Furthermore, Congressional involvement in various aspects of
health care undermines any argument of state exclusivity in this area.
To counter this assertion, several proponents of exclusive state author-
ity point to language in a variety of state statutes expressing Congres-
sional intent of noninterference in this area.'" 9 For example, Medicare
legislation declares: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision
or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medi-
cal services are provided . . . ."'9 To defeat this claim, Professor Lars
Noah notes that the legislative records for these statutes offers little
explanation for these provisions, as ". . . the similarity in their lan-
guage suggests that they have become essentially boilerplate."l 9' The-
se provisions also "endorse deference to professional autonomy rather
than the primacy of state regulation" and "appear to represent a con-
cession to the political pressure exerted by organized medicine rather
than any admission of possible constitutional limitations on the power
of Congress to regulate in the field." 92
The following examples of current federal regulation of health
care underscore Professor Noah's observations. First, in accordance
above with the Supreme Court's allowance of concurrent federal po-
lice power regulation under an enumerated constitutional power, Con-
gress has invoked the Spending Clause to impose limited regulation of
health care under its power to spend for the general welfare. For ex-
ample, the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
of 1974 requires states to adopt certificate of need laws related to
health facility planning. 93 Other examples include Medicare and
Medicaid participation requirements, which among other things, im-
pose operational standards and accreditation rules on health care pro-
viders in exchange for funding.' 94
Second, Congress has imposed regulations even in the absence of
a Spending Clause justification. For example, in 1992, Congress en-
acted the Mammography Quality Standards Act, which requires that
all facilities performing mammographies be certified by the FDA.'95
189 Noah, supra note 125, at 169.
"o 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006).
191 Noah, supra note 125, at 167.
192 id.
'9 National Health Planning and Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. §
300n-1 (2006).
194 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (2006) (defining 'hospital' within the context of
Medicare regulations); 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m) (defining 'home health services' within
the context of Medicare regulations); 42 C.F.R. § 484.1-55 (2001) (regulating various
types of providers).
1' 42 U.S.C. § 263b(b)(1).
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Also, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act regulates technologies associ-
ated with health care delivery.1 96
D. Current State Regulation Is Likely Unconstitutional Under the
Dormant Commerce Clause
Finally, the exclusivity and legitimacy of state authority over tel-
emedicine regulation is further undermined by its arguable unconstitu-
tionality under the Dormant Commerce Clause. The emergence and
growth of health care into a national and international commercial
industry currently places state regulation of this area in conflict with
the Federal Commerce Power. As discussed earlier, advances in tech-
nology and medical knowledge have transformed the health industry
from a local to a global commercial activity.197 The increasing dis-
coveries and uses of advanced technologies not only allow for health
professionals to remotely provide services but also prompt patients to
travel across state and national borders for innovative procedures not
available. Many health professionals work with large managed care
networks or national hospital chains; 1 they also "advertise services
that attract both local and distant customers." 99 Thus, such business
operation and transactions constitute activities affecting interstate
commerce and intrude upon the Commerce Clause.
Under Article I, §8, of the Constitution, Congress has ".
[p]ower ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . ."200 The Supreme
Court interprets the Commerce Clause to mean that Congress has the
sole authority to engage in interstate and foreign commercial regula-
tion. 20 1 Because this is an area of enumerated federal concern in the
Constitution, a state(s) effectively may not discriminate against goods
and services from other states and nations.202 In barring such discrim-
196 The FDA only has authority to regulate those health-related drugs and
devices that meet the federal statutory definition of these products. A medical device
is defined to include:
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in
vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component,
part, or accessory, which is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of disease
or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, in man or animals.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006).
197 See supra Part I.
198 Noah, supra note 125, at 169.
'99 Id. at 170.200 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
201 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 26-27 (1824).
202 See id.
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ination, the Commerce Clause endeavors to achieve three goals: (1)
prevent state laws that interfere with interstate commerce; (2) prevent
protectionist legislation in furtherance of the national economy; and
203(3) ensure equal protection of the laws to citizens of all states.
One of the functions of the Commerce Clause is to invalidate state
and local laws because they place an undue burden on interstate
commerce.204 Although the Constitution does not expressly state this
doctrine, the Supreme Court has interpreted Article I, § 8, to confer
this power to Congress. 2 05 This doctrine, known as the Dormant
Commerce Clause, is invoked as a challenge to state or local actions
in areas where Congress has yet to act or where there is no explicit
206federal law pre-emption. In other words, the Commerce Clause
grants the judicial branch authority in some circumstances to limit
state and local regulation in the absence of Congressional action. The
application of the Commerce Clause in such a manner to challenge the
constitutionality of state health regulation is appropriate here. As this
Article discussed earlier, Congress has intervened in various aspects
of the health care industry, but such regulations are silent or ambigu-
ous on pre-emption and states have historically played and still play a
principal role in regulating this area.207
In determining whether a police power that burdens interstate
commerce should be upheld or invalidated as violating the Dormant
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has developed and applied at
203 See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539-43 (1949). In
South Carolina Highway Dep't. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., Justice Stone reinforced the
establishment of the Dormant Commerce Clause by expressing the Court's distrust of
a state's political process to give equal treatment to residents and non-residents who
lacked representation:
Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in judicial
opinion, that when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls
principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be
subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legisla-
tion where it affects adversely some interests within the state.
303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938) (citations omitted).
204 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970). When the
Commerce Clause limits state and local regulation in the absence of Congressional
action, the Supreme Court and scholars call this doctrine the "Dormant" or "Nega-
tive" Commerce Clause. See generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L.
REv. 1091 (1986).
20 See DuMond, 336 U.S. at 539, 545.
206 See Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (finding that exercising judicial power to defend the Commerce Clause is
required because state and local laws "are individually too petty, too diversified, and
too local to get the attention of a Congress hard pressed with more urgent matters.").
207 See supra Part Ill.
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least one of the following three tests: (1) national versus local subject
matter test (subject matter test), (2) direct versus indirect effects on
commerce test (direct-indirect effects test), and (3) balancing test.20 8
An analysis below of these tests in the context of health protection
will show that while state regulation may have been valid in the past,
such regulation is likely unconstitutional in light of the health care
industry's recent expansion on national and global levels.
1. Failure Under the Subject Matter Test
Under the subject matter test, a state law violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause if the law regulates national subject matter but is
upheld if it regulates local subject matter. 209 The Court defines na-
tional subject matter as "demanding a single uniform rule, operating
equally on the commerce of the United States in every port," while
local subject matter "imperatively demand[s] diversity, which alone
can meet the local necessities ... 210 In the context of state health
regulation, the distinction between national and local subject matter is
further clarified in the following two cases, Norris v. The City of Bos-
ton, and Smith v. Turner, which were argued together and grouped as
The Passenger Cases.2 11 In these cases, Boston and New York had
established state public hospitals whose duties included determining if
ship passengers landing in their ports were infected with communica-
ble diseases.2 12 To fund these hospitals, the states imposed a head tax
on persons landing in their ports.2 13 The Court held this tax to be an
208 These tests reflect the evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence in this
area, but none of these tests have been overruled and earlier tests have been applied to
cases even after later tests were set forth. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
N.Y. Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (applying the direct/indirect test to invalidate
state regulation of alcohol to the disadvantage of out-of-staters); California v. Zook,
336 U.S. 725, 727, 733, 738 (1949) (applying the local/national test to uphold state
statute prohibiting the sale or arrangement of any interstate transportation of persons
over state highways); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319-21
(1851) (applying local/national test to uphold state law requiring use of local pilot or
payment of fine for ships in Port of Philadelphia).
209 Cooley, 53 U.S. 299.
210 Id. at 319.
211 The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 283 (1849). It should be
noted that this case precedes Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851), the seminal case in which the Court fully articulated the subject matter test
and is discussed later in this section. The reader should also be aware that in The
Passenger Cases, the Court was split five to four in its decision to invalidate a state
law on every incoming passenger to pay for the costs of health inspections and treat-
ment, but the holding and reasoning employed by the Court are still good law and
thus influence subsequent relevant Supreme Court cases.
212 See id. at 284-85.
213 Id. 393, 409.
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impermissible restriction on interstate commerce and foreign trade.214
In reaching this conclusion to invalidate the New York tax, Justice
McLean noted that while states hold the "power of self-preservation"
to maintain the health and safety of its citizenry,2 15 the state has "no
power . . . to tax objects not subject to its jurisdiction" absent "peculi-
ar emergencies and to a limited extent." 216 Here, the New York tax
went beyond the state's jurisdiction by imposing on instruments of
interstate commerce, which included a ship's officers and crew and
foreign passengers. 2 17
Given such plenary power accorded to Congress under the Com-
merce Clause, a state may only exercise any infringing police powers
under the following exceptions: (1) there is no less burdensome way
to deal with an issue of local concern; or (2) if Congress expressly
provided authorization. Such exceptions are illustrated in Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, which involved a Pennsylvania law requiring all
ships accessing the Port of Philadelphia to use a local pilot or pay a
fine.2 18 The Court upheld the law because it qualified as local subject
matter for two reasons: (1) unique characteristics of ports and the im-
practicability of making them uniform,219 and (2) a 1789 federal law
expressly authorizing states to regulate piloting. 220 Even though the
Court acknowledged that navigation fell under the Commerce Clause
power, the Court came to conclude that ports were local subject matter
because of their "local peculiarities" and that implementing changes
to these different systems would be so "impracticable" that "it cannot
be supposed uniformity was required." 22 1
Here, the application of the subject matter test and the Court's
reasoning above to state regulation of various aspects of the health
care industry likely leads to the conclusion that such regulation is un-
constitutional. First, as this Article has demonstrated, interstate tele-
medicine does not possess "local peculiarities" to warrant exclusive
222local attention. Second, just as with the head tax in The Passenger
Cases, many of these regulations impact actors and activities that in-
214 Id. at 409-10.
215 Id. at 400.
216 Id. at 408.
217 Id. at 408-09.
218 Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 300 (1852).
219 Id. at 314.
220 Id. at 319-20.
221 Id. at 314 (determining states should be allowed to regulate ports because
the "consequent impossibility of having its charges uniform throughout the United
States [as] sufficient of itself to prove that they could not have been intended to be
embraced within [the Commerce] [C]lause").
222 See supra Part Ill.
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volve interstate and foreign commerce. Third, these regulations argu-
ably are not directly related to advancing local safety concerns. For
example, in medical malpractice cases, a growing number of state
courts have rejected the traditional "locality" rule to embrace a na-
tional standard of care.223 Thus, state borders no longer determine
whether a health professional has the skills or competency to treat a
state's residents.2 24
Finally, the exceptions allowing a state law to violate the Com-
merce Power do not apply here. First, there are less burdensome ways
to provide for such protection and these ways are not impracticable to
implement. For example, several scholars have observed that the
framework for the replacement of individual state licensing systems
with one national licensure system is already in place. 2 25 Educational
and professional competency requirements for each state are similar in
mandating that licensed practitioners graduate from an accredited
medical school and pass the United States Medical licensing exam,
which is nationally standardized.22 6 Specialization in a medical area
requires passing another nationally standardized exam to become
board certified.227 The establishment of a National Practitioner Data
Bank also streamlines this process, as it collects information about
physicians on a nationwide basis, including licensure matters.228
Furthermore, proponents argue that national licensing alternatives
are already successfully implemented by the following federal enti-
ties: The Veterans Administration, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and
the U.S. military. 229 Professor Alison Sulentic notes that U.S. military
law permits any health professional who holds a state license to prac-
tice anywhere in the nation as long as she or he is providing direct
patient care in a hospital affiliated with the Department of Defense. 230
This "military license" pre-empts the local standards of the jurisdic-
tion in which the health professional practices by only requiring that
the professional comply with the standards of the state in which he or
223 Noah, supra note 125, at 165.
224 See id.
225 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 87, at 241-42; McLean, supra note 14, at
504-05; Volkert, supra note 11, at 177-78.
226 Volkert, supra note 11, at 177-78.
227 Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Dialogue with a Neurosurgeon: Toward a Dipeqage
Approach to Achieve Tort Reform and Perverse Corrective Justice in Medical Mal-
practice Cases, 71 U. PITr. L. REV. 1, 3 n.6 (2009).
228 Volkert, supra note 11, at 178.
229 Alison M. Sulentic, Crossing Borders: The Licensure of Interstate: Tele-
medicine Practitioners, 25 J. LEGIS. 1, 37 (1999).
230 Id.
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she is licensed.2 3 1 Given that courts are increasingly adopting a na-
tional standard of care in malpractice cases, and medical educational
and competency requirements employ nationally standardized proce-
dures, the extension of a "military license" in a civil context seems
fitting. Additionally, the FDA's national regulation of drugs and med-
ical devices discussed earlier demonstrates that federal oversight is a
workable alternative as it is practical to regulate diverse aspects of the
health care industry. 2 32 Finally, the need for state authority fails under
the last exception because Congress has never expressly authorized
states to regulate in this field.
2. Failure Under the Direct-Indirect Effects Test
Under the direct-indirect effects test, a state law that directly inter-
feres with interstate or foreign commerce is invalid but is upheld if
such interference has an indirect effect on interstate or foreign com-
merce.233 Direct interference with the Commerce Clause arises when
state laws subject interstate market participants to inconsistent obliga-
tions in different states. 234 In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New
York State Liquor Authority, the state sought to obtain the lowest pos-
sible prices for its citizens by requiring alcohol distillers to file a
schedule affirming that their selling price in the state was as low as
other prices offered in other states.235 During this time, twenty other
states had similar laws.236 The Court invalidated such a law, in part,
because New York contributed to the maze of inconsistent regulations
that distillers were subjected to by defining "effective" liquor prices
differently from other states. 23 7  This requirement "effectively
force[d]" distillers to drop their promotional allowance program in
other states and other states had to alter their own regulations to ac-
commodate New York's pricing schedule. 238 Such effective interfer-
231 id.
232 See supra Part III.
233 DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927), overruled on other grounds,
California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941). In Thompson, the Court narrowed the
DiSanto holding, which deemed a state regulation that affected interstate transporta-
tion to be unconstitutional, to permitting such regulations in cases (1) involving local
concerns, and (2) where there are no infringements upon matters of national interest
and regulatory uniformity. 313 U.S. at 116.
234 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
572, 582-83 (1986).
235 Id. at 576.
236 id.
237 Id. at 583-84.
238 Id. at 584.
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ence with other states' commerce and regulatory schemes constituted
an impermissible violation of the Commerce Clause.239
Furthermore, it is also important to note here that Brown-Foreman
highlights the dominance of the Commerce Clause when a state's con-
stitutional rights over certain domains are involved.24 o Specifically in
this case, the right invoked is the state's Twenty-First Amendment
power to regulate the sales of liquor within its territory.2 41 While the
Court acknowledges the validity of such a constitutional right, it notes
that "[t]he Commerce Clause operates with full force whenever one
State attempts to regulate transportation and sale of alcoholic bever-
ages destined for distribution and consumption in a foreign country . .
. or another State." 242 As the Court's above analysis of the New York
law demonstrates, if a state regulation impacts business decisions
made by interstate market participants and other states' regulatory
schemes, the Commerce Clause invalidates such a regulation.
Here, similar to the New York law in Brown Foreman, a variety
of state health regulations impermissibly interfere with the Commerce
Clause because they subject interstate telemedicine providers to in-
consistent regulations. As discussed earlier, state regulations involv-
ing licensing, insurance, and information privacy place impose barri-
ers so difficult to overcome that many of these providers are discour-
aged from conducting interstate business.243
3. Failure Under the Balancing Test
Under the balancing test, the benefits of a state law are weighed
against the burdens it imposes on interstate commerce in order to as-
sess its constitutionality. The Court begins its analysis by determining
whether a law facially discriminates against or is facially neutral to-
wards interstate commerce. Facially discriminatory laws textually
draw a distinction between in-staters and out-of-staters and are pre-
sumed unconstitutional. 2 44 A law is deemed neutral on its face if it
239 Id.
240 Id. at 584-85 (noting that the Court's task is to reconcile the interests of
conflicting constitutional provisions. The Court states that in case of the Commerce
Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment, "each must be considered in light of the
other[,I and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case"
(quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964)).
241 Id. at 585.
242 Id. (citation omitted).
243 See supra Part II.
244 See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 618, 626-27 (1978)
(holding that a state law which prevented importation of waste from out-of-state was
facially discriminatory); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951)
2011]1 423
HEAL TH MA TRIX
applies equally to in-state and out-of-state citizens.245 Facially neutral
laws are considered unconstitutional if their purpose and/or effect are
discriminatory.2 46 Both types of laws will be upheld if they serve a
legitimate local police power purpose and if it is the least burdensome
method on interstate commerce to achieve that purpose. 24 7
A review of the Court's decision in Dean Milk Co. v. Madison is
instructive in evaluating the ways in which facially discriminatory
laws in the context of current health regulation would likely be uncon-
stitutional.248 In Dean Milk Co., a local law required all milk sold in
Madison to be pasteurized within five miles of the city. 2 49 According
to the Court, this ordinance was facially discriminatory because it
prevented milk pasteurized from other states from being sold in the
city. The city defended the ordinance by applying its police power to
protect the health and safety of its citizens. 250 The Court acknowl-
edged the validity of the state's police power, but noted that such a
power is only paramount to the Commerce Clause if no less burden-
some methods exist to achieve the offending regulations stipulated
goals:
In thus erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local
industry against competition from without the State, Madison
plainly discriminates against interstate commerce. This it can-
not do, even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to pro-
tect the health and safety of its people, if reasonable nondis-
criminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local
interests, are available.25 1
(deeming a city ordinance requiring milk be pasteurized within five miles of city to be
deemed facially discriminatory).
245 See Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354 (finding that a Madison ordinance,
which only permitted the sale of mile that was processed and bottled at an approved
Madison pasteurization plant within a five-mile radius of the city is facially neutral
because it applies equally to intrastate and interstate milk suppliers).
246 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389-
95 (1994); see also Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
352-53 (1977) (invalidating a facially neutral state law banning the importation of
non-USDA grade apples because the law discriminated against interstate commerce
and did not advance a legitimate state interest).
247 See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352-53 (stating that court would uphold a discrimi-
natory state commerce law where the State proves a legitimate state interest resulting
from the law and the State proves the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives); Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 353-56.
248 See Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. 349.
249 Id. at 350.
250 See id at 354.
251 id.
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The Court proceeded to find that less burdensome methods exist-
ed (e.g., the use of health inspectors), and declared the ordinance inva-
lid because it was "not essential for the protection of local health in-
terests."252 In cases where no suitable alternative method for such
interests exists, the discriminatory law is upheld. For example, in
Maine v. Taylor, the Court upheld a state statute barring the import of
minnows in order to preserve the health of the local minnow popula-
tion because the state's marine ecology was endangered and no less
restrictive method would yield the same results.253
Extending this balancing test analysis to facially neutral laws that
operate analogously to current state health regulations further under-
scores the latter's unconstitutionality. A review of case law concern-
ing state regulation of highways is apt here because the Court has
deemed such power to regulate similar to protection of citizens' health
and safety.254 The Court considers such regulation to be a "peculiarly
local . . . subject of safety . . . akin to quarantine measures."255 Given
such a deferential view, the Court has historically upheld state laws in
this area "despite the fact that they may have an impact on interstate
commerce." 256 Notwithstanding such deference, the Court will invali-
date such a law if its resulting benefits are minimal and the costs to
interstate commerce are great:
Unless [the Court] can conclude on the whole record that 'the
total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing acci-
dents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to
outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce
free from interferences which seriously impede it' [citation
omitted] [the Court] must uphold the statute.257
Applying that balancing test in Bibb v. Navajo Freight lines, Inc.,
the Court found the state law requiring curved mudguards on inter-
state carriers to be an impermissible violation of the Commerce
Clause. There, the Court found the benefits of such a safety measure
to be questionable at best and the burden on interstate commerce to be
excessive.258 This safety requirement imposed excessive costs by pre-
scribing standards that conflict with other states, thus forcing the in-
252 Id. at 355-56.
253 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 141, 150 (1986).
254 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523 (1959).
255 Id. at 523-24.
256 Id. at 523.
257 Id. at 524 (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76
(1945)).
258 Id. at 528.
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dustry to invest time and money in conforming to these various stand-
ards in order to conduct interstate business. 259 The Court pointed to
the nearby state of Arkansas opposite requirement of straight or con-
ventional mudguards as an example. 260
Just as importantly, the burden on interstate may still be held as
excessive even if the state law is not inconsistent with other state
laws, but imposes great costs to comply with such regulation. 2 6 1 For
example, the Court has invalidated several state laws banning inter-
state carriers of certain sizes and/or weights within their territories
because of their speculative benefits and substantial burden on inter-
262
state commerce. In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., the
Court invalidated the state's ban on 65-foot double trailers because the
"State failed to present any persuasive evidence that 65-foot [trailers
were] less safe than 55-foot [trailers]" and the law "substantially bur-
dens [interstate commerce]" by forcing these trucks to avoid the state
or to detach the trailers and ship them separately. 2 63
Here, state health regulations will likely be regarded as facially
neutral laws, as they treat in-stater and out-of-staters equally, but
deemed unconstitutional because their purpose and/or effect are dis-
criminatory. As an earlier examination of barriers to telemedicine
demonstrates, these regulations apply to all parties but their effect is to
impede out-of-staters from doing business in a state.264 An application
of the balancing test to these regulations also shows that they are un-
likely the least burdensome method on interstate commerce to achieve
that purpose. An earlier cited example of replacing the state licensing
system with a national system is relevant here as well, as national
standards are already being used to test the competency and skills of
health professionals.265
Overall, an examination of these tests have shown that the Court
uses them to ensure that state regulations are not are veiled forms of
economic protectionism to help local industries. The application of
these tests shows that several forms of state health regulation are un-
259 Id. But see South Carolina State Highway Dep't. v. Barnwell, 303 U.S.
177, 179, 196 (1938) (upholding state law barring use of motor and semitrailer trucks
on state highways whose width and weight exceeded certain thresholds).
260 Bibb, 359 U.S. at 527.
261 See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671
(1981) (invalidating state law banning sixty-five foot double trailers); Raymond Mo-
tor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978) (invalidating a state law banning
double-trailer trucks and trucks exceeding fifty-five feet).
262 Raymond, 434 U.S. at 447.
263 Kassel, 450 U.S. at 671, 674.
264 See supra Part II.
265 See supra Part III(B).
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constitutional because the only interests they seem to advance are
those of the local industry players at the cost of citizens' health and
safety.
IV. FOUNDATIONS FOR A UNIFORM REGULATORY
REGIME: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NATIONAL
TELEMEDICINE REGULATION
In addition to providing a legal basis for invalidating current
forms of health care regulation that involve interstate and foreign
commerce, the Constitution provides grounds for Congress to legislate
in these areas. First, just as the Commerce Clause may be invoked to
limit state and local regulation, it may also be invoked to authorize
266federal action. Second, the Spending Power grants Congress the
broad power to spend for the general welfare so long as it does not
violate other Constitutional provisions.26 7
A. Congressional Authority to Regulate under the Interstate
Commerce Clause
Congress has the constitutional power to regulate commerce
among states if such regulation passes the "Substantial Effect" test
established in the seminal 1995 Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Lopez.268 Under this test, federal legislation is permissible if
it falls under one of the following types of activities:
(1) Regulation of use of channels of interstate commerce;269
(2) Regulation and protection of instrumentalities of interstate
commerce 270; or
(3) Regulation of activities having substantial effect on com-
merce.271
In evaluating whether Congressional action falls under either of
these categories, the Court applies rational basis review. Rational ba-
266 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195-96 (1824) ("But, in regulat-
ing commerce with foreign nations, the power of Congress does not stop at the juris-
dictional lines of the several States ... The power of Congress, then, whatever it may
be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States").
267 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936).
268 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995).
269 Id. at 558.
270 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261
(1964).
271 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
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sis review only requires that Congress choose a means that is reasona-
bly adapted to achieve its goals.272 In addition to the history of case
law on interstate commerce and police powers detailed above, an ex-
amination below of the Court's interpretation of each of these catego-
ries supports the conclusion that Congress has a constitutional right to
regulate health care when interstate and foreign actors and activities
are involved.
1. Federal Regulation of Health Care Concerns the Use of Channels of
Interstate Commerce
This first category requires that the proposed federal regulation in
question concerns the use of channels of interstate commerce.273 To
define "channels of interstate commerce," the Lopez Court offered the
following concrete examples that necessarily involved out-of-state
actors and transactions: intrastate coal mining, restaurants using sub-
274
stantial interstate supplies, and hotels serving interstate guests. Fur-
thermore, the Lopez Court interpreted this element to mean that the
federal regulation in question excludes activity not directly economic
27in nature, even if there are indirect economic consequences. 2 For
example, in Lopez, the Court held that the federal Gun-Free School
Zone Act was invalid because possession of a gun in a school zone
was too tangentially related to interstate commerce to be within Con-
gressional authority. The Act itself did not regulate commerce, and no
formal findings demonstrated a link between commerce and gun pos-
276
session.
2. Federal Regulation of Health Care Concerns the Protection of
Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce
This second category requires the proposed federal action "to reg-
ulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or per-
sons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities." 27 7 The Lopez Court offers the
following examples of applicable "persons" or "things": destruction of
aircraft, thefts from interstate shipments, and regulation of rail-
roads.278
272 Id. at 557.
273 Id. at 558.
274 Id. at 559.
275 Id. at 562.
276 Id. at 562-63.
277 Id. at 558.
278 Id.
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3. Federal Regulation of Health Care Concerns Activities Having a
Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce
This third category requires the proposed federal regulation to in-
volve only "those activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce." 279 The Lopez Court defined "substantial effect" to include
intrastate production of a commodity that in the aggregate impacts
interstate economic activity. 28 0 There, the Court held that Congress's
commerce authority applies to ban the cultivation and possession of
small amounts of home-consumed marijuana despite a state law per-
mitting otherwise. 281 According to the Court, home production of ma-
rijuana in the aggregate would have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce because home consumption "would have a substantial in-
fluence on price and market conditions." 2 82
After a review of each of these categories, it is likely that inter-
state telemedicine falls under all three categories. Unlike the Gun-Free
School Zone Act in Lopez, various state health regulations involve
direct links to interstate and foreign commerce by allowing or denying
a telemedicine provider to conduct business across borders. Further-
more, as an earlier examination of the barriers to telemedicine demon-
strates, these regulations undeniably impact the price and market con-
283ditions of health care services.
B. Congressional Authority to Regulate under the Spending Power
Clause
In addition to the Commerce Clause, federal regulation of health
care is constitutionally permissible under the Spending Power enu-
merated in Article 1, Section 8: "Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform through-
out the United States."284
In United States v. Butler, the Supreme Court established the
scope of Congress's Spending Power broadly to mean that Congress
may spend for the general welfare in furtherance of goals beyond
those stipulated in Article I, so long as it does not violate other Con-
279 Id. at 559.
280 Id. at 561.
281 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005).
282 id.
283 See supra Part 11.
284 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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stitutional provisions. 285 In reaching this interpretation, the Court
adopted Alexander Hamilton's view that:
the clause confers a power separate and distinct from those
later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the grant of
them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to
tax and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it
shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the
United States. 28 6
Because of the expansive reach of the Spending Power, scholars
have argued that this clause provides an ideal basis for Congress to
implement concurrent federal regulation of health care.287 This Article
has already pointed to instances where Congress has invoked the
Spending Power to regulate various aspects of health care.288 As long
as each of the following three criteria is met, Congress may regulate:
(1) The federal regulation in question advances the general
welfare; 289
(2) The federal regulation in question is clearly expressed to
recipient states and bear some relationship to the spending
program; 290 and
(3) The federal regulation is voluntarily accepted by States.29'
285 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (holding Congressional regulation of agricultural
products through subsidies under the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act did not vio-
late the Tenth Amendment as Congress has the constitutional power to tax and spend
for the general welfare). Subsequent cases support the Court's view of broad Con-
gressional authority under the taxing and spending clauses. See, e.g., Sabri v. United
States, 541 U.S. 600, 605-06 (2004) (finding federal criminal law banning bribery of
state, local, and tribal officials by entities receiving at least ten thousand dollars in
federal funds deemed constitutional); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (find-
ing the Social Security Act's old age pension program supported by federal taxes was
constitutional); Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581-83 (1937)
(Social Security Act establishing the federal unemployment system deemed constitu-
tional).
286 Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66.
287 See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Commentary, The Case for
Federalism and Health Care Reform, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 115 (1995); Noah, supra note
125, at 169 ("[B]ecause the Supreme Court has not yet imposed any meaningful limi-
tations on the spending power, the federal government could regulate health care
professionals without ever having to invoke the Commerce Clause.").
288 See supra Part III.
289 Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
290 Pennhurst State Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); see South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987).
291 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
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An analysis below of these three criteria will demonstrate that the
exercise of Spending Power is permissible in the proposal for more
extensive federal health regulation.
1. Federal Health Regulation Advances the General Welfare
First, the federal regulation in question must "advance the general
welfare" stipulated under the Spending Power. The Court's broad
definition of the Spending Power will likely allow for the inclusion of
health care as an acceptable area of federal involvement. The Court
has traditionally deferred to Congress on determining what constitutes
advancing the general welfare:
The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clear-
ly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
judgment ... Nor is the concept of the general welfare static.
Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be in-
terwoven in our day with the well-being of the Nation. 29 2
As a result of such judicial deference, Congress has been able to
regulate in areas beyond its enumerated authority under the Constitu-
tion to those of exclusive state concern. For example, in South Dakota
v. Dole, the Court approved Congress's requirement that states impose
a twenty-one year old drinking age in order to receive federal highway
funds.293 The Court reasoned that "[e]ven if Congress might lack the
power to impose a national minimum drinking age directly, we con-
clude that encouragement to state action . .. is a valid use of spending
power." 294 Furthermore, Congress has the discretion to decide what-
ever terms and conditions it deems appropriate in dispensing funds. In
Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, the Court upheld the Hatch
Act granting federal funds on the condition that states adopt civil ser-
vice systems and limit the political activities of government work-
ers.295 In reinforcing the reach of the Spending Power, the Court noted
that "[w]hile the United States is not concerned with and has no power
to regulate local political activities as such of state officials, it does
have power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states
shall be disbursed." 29 6 Thus, given such wide discretion accorded to
Congress, federal regulation of health care would likely be deemed a
valid advancement of the general welfare under the Spending Power.
292 Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-41.
293 Dole, 483 U.S. at 212.
294 id
295 See Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947).
296 id.
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2. Congress Should Ensure that Recipient States Be Aware of the
Federal Regulation In Question and that the Regulation Bear Some
Relationship to the Purpose of the Spending Program
Second, the only limitations to such plenary power are that Con-
gress clearly inform the recipient states of the regulations in question
and that these regulations bear some relationship to the purpose of the
spending program. The Court highlighted the importance of informing
states of the terms of accepting federal funding in Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman.297 There, the Court noted that Con-
gress may impose regulations via grants to state and local govern-
ments as long as these regulations are "unambiguously" stated so that
states know the consequences of accepting such funding. As to the
second limitation, the Court requires that regulation must promote the
objectives of the federal funding initiative. In Dole, the Court found
that Congress's twenty-one year old drinking age requirement was
directly related to one of the main aims of the federal highway pro-
gram because it sought to create safe interstate travel.298 Thus, as long
as Congress takes care to provide notice of these regulations and pair
health objectives with the appropriate regulations in questions, such
regulatory initiatives will likely be permissible.
3. Implementation of Federal Health Depends on States' Voluntary
Acceptance of Funds
Finally, states must voluntary accept these funds in order for them
to be bound by the federal requirements in question. 2 99 Here, the fed-
eral government already buys substantial portion of physician and
clinical services, thus providing the basis on which the Spending
Power may be exercised. 3 00 As discussed earlier, Congress has im-
posed limited regulation under several of its health-related funding
programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid.30' Congress should con-
sider using existing programs such as these as a basis for establishing
more comprehensive and standardized regulation. Even more specifi-
cally and to this point, the federal Telecommunications Reform Act of
297 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
298 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208, 212.
299 Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. at 143 (upholding the Hatch Act granting
federal funds to states on the condition that states adopt civil service systems and limit
the political activities of government workers); see Dole, 483 U.S. at 210, 212 (up-
holding a federal law establishing a twenty-one year old drinking age by withholding
a portion of federal highway funds from any state government that failed to impose
such a drinking age).300 Noah, supra note 125, at 169.
301 See supra Part II.
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1996 offers an ideal opportunity in the context of telemedicine. 30 2
This Act ensures that rural health care providers have access to tele-
communications service at rates comparable to those enjoyed by their
urban counterparts. 303 Thus, the Spending Power offers existing and
potential opportunities for uniform standards and regulations in tele-
medicine.
V. PROPOSALS FOR A UNIFORM REGULATORY
REGIME IN THE UNITED STATES
The above establishment of a constitutional basis for Congres-
sional involvement in interstate telemedicine opens the door to the
considerations of workable and successful national alternatives to
current state regulatory frameworks. Proponents of federal authority
note that such a transfer of authority is optimal and feasible for the
following reasons: (1) transaction costs and administrative inefficien-
cies will no longer operate as prohibitive barriers to market entry, (2)
uniformity will advance public policy goals that state regulatory sys-
tems have been unable to achieve,3 04 (3) limited de facto national
standardization already exists to a certain extent in several areas of
health care, and (4) the development and/or implementation of a uni-
form system for health care delivery in other nations and regions
demonstrate that such a model is successful on an operational level.
Each of these reasons is analyzed below.
A. Federal Regulation Could Reduce Barriers to Telemedicine by
Lowering or Eliminating Transaction Costs and Administrative
Inefficiencies
The imposition of national standards in interstate telemedicine
could reduce and/or remove transaction costs and administrative inef-
ficiencies that currently dissuade telemedicine providers from operat-
ing regionally and/or nationally. To avoid such a predicament, schol-
ars have postulated that a federal system would eliminate the adminis-
trative difficulties and costs of obtaining licenses in each state's juris-
302 See 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2006) (requiring the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) to assure that health care providers in rural areas have access to tele-
communications services at rates comparable to those found in urban areas); Tele-
communications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
303 47 U.S.C. § 254.
3 See P. Greg Gulick, Note, The Development of a Global Hospital is Closer
Than We Think: An Examination of the International Implications of Telemedicine
and the Developments, Uses and Problems Facing International Telemedicine Pro-
grams, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 183, 205-07 (2000).
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diction and allow for "a greater degree of flexibility in [the health
professional's] practice with the confidence that his compliance with
basic quality standards was assured." 305
Just as importantly, federal regulation of interstate telemedicine
has the potential to reduce costs and uncertainty related to legal liabil-
ity. For instance, the imposition of federal jurisdiction and federal
laws governing telemedicine disputes involving citizens of different
states may help to resolve jurisdiction and the following choice of law
concerns: which state law applies when parties are from different
states and whether substantive federal laws should be enacted. In light
of the legal principles that presently guide the U.S. judicial system,
such a proposition may be considered unworkable and unrealistic at
this time and in the short-term future. The Erie Doctrine mandates that
citizens from different states may bring a claim in federal court, but
such a claim is governed by state law unless it is based upon a federal
question to be decided by federal law. 306 Under such a legal regime,
one may bring a telemedicine dispute in a state court, but such claims
may be removed by the defendant to federal court, under the federal
court's diversity jurisdiction. 307 Regardless of forum, state law would
apply in federal court diversity actions as Congress has yet to enact
any telemedicine statutes seeking to modify state jurisdiction or liabil-
ity rules.308
The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed that states govern medical
malpractice law in noting that "Congress has no power to declare sub-
stantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be
local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or part of the
law of torts." 30 9 As long as the telemedicine dispute in question in-
volves a health care provider and a patient within one state, local laws
should and do apply. However, when the health care provider and
patient are in different states, the appropriate mechanism would be to
hold legal proceedings based on federal procedures and substantive
laws. As this Article has discussed, the U.S. Supreme Court jurispru-
dence has upheld concurrent or pre-emptive federal involvement in
interstate activities implicating traditionally local concerns. 310 These
instances include upholding the following federal measures: the Labor
305 Sulentic, supra note 229, at 36.
306 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
307 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
308 See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 ("The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply.").
3 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
310 See supra Part III.C.
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Standards Act of 1938, which ban the shipment of interstate com-
merce of goods made by employees paid less than minimum wage; 3 1 1
imposing penalties on the interstate transportation of lottery tickets;3 12
banning interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes; 313
and banning the mailing of obscene matter. 3 14
In light of the inadequacies of the present judicial system and the
nation's escalating health care crisis, it behooves Congress to serious-
ly consider adoption of federal measures in interstate telemedicine
disputes. As this Article has argued, federal measures are constitu-
tionally permissible.3 15 Even though U.S. jurisprudence has historical-
ly allocated health care regulation to states, proposals for broader reg-
ulatory authority are not as radical or unworkable as critics are wont
to claim for the following reasons. First, the transition from local to
more centralized authority is not a novel concept to this nation, as this
Article earlier detailed the nation's transformation of health care regu-
lation, albeit on a smaller scale, from a municipal to a state function
during the post-Civil War period.316 Second, the circumstances that
necessitated such a transformation during that time are present today:
advances in technology and medical knowledge, and the need to pro-
tect and provide for public health and safety as a result of greater ac-
cess to and quality of health care.3 17
Finally, Congress has long indicated intent in federalizing some
aspects of health care, as proposals for federal involvement have been
a continuous issue of discussion at least as far back as the late
1960s. 1 Such discussions first began around that time when the fed-
eral government sought to reduce health care expenditures by resolv-
ing the crisis of rising costs of medical malpractice litigation. 3 9 Fed-
eral legislators began submitting proposals for medical malpractice
reform throughout the 1970s to the present. 32 0 This trend has been
exhibited by both Republicans and Democrats at different points in
time.321 In 1996, Republican Bill Archer introduced the Health Cover-
age Availability and Affordability Act, which advocated for federal
311 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1941).
312 Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 362-64 (1903).
313 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913).
314 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1957).
315 See supra Part IV.
316 See supra Part III.
317 Id.; see supra Part I.
318 See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for Na-
tional Action in Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLuM. L. REv. 844, 857 (2009).
319 Id. at 852.
320 Id. at 858-59.
321 See id.
4352011]1
HEALTHMATRIX
damages caps and restrictions on medical malpractice suits. 322 In
2005, then Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama sought to pro-
tect physicians from state liability under certain circumstances.323
While these proposals have failed to pass into law,324 it is reasonable
to expect that over time federal legislators will come to consensus
over common areas of health care. An instance where this has already
happened can be seen in the enactment of the federal Mammography
Quality Standards Act in 1992, which, as this Article discussed earli-
er, requires FDA certification for all mammography facilities.325
Furthermore, the ongoing health care debate indicates movement
towards potential consensus over federal control of certain aspects of
health care regulation traditionally under state control.326 For instance,
President Obama's health care proposal seeks to establish the Health
Insurance Rate Authority (HIRA), which calls for federal involvement
in regulation of health insurers. 3 27 To counteract the rapid rise of pre-
mium rates, the HIRA would "provide needed oversight at the Federal
level and help States determine how rate review will be enforced and
monitor insurance market behavior." 328 Although the establishment of
an HIRA remains a point of contention, 32 9 given the historical roles of
federal and state governments in health care, it is very doubtful that
the federal incursions of this magnitude would have been proposed or
entertained prior to the current crisis of rising health care costs.
As evidenced by Congressional and public reaction to President
Obama's proposal, the political climate presently allows for serious
consideration of greater federal control in health care. However, as the
longstanding Congressional stalemate on medical malpractice reform
322 Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act, H.R. 3160, 104th
Cong. § 271, 282 (1996) (the proposed caps on damages include: (1) limitations for
health care liability actions brought in a State or Federal court against a health care
provider, (2) a limitation on the total amount of noneconomic damages which may be
awarded to a claimant for losses resulting from an injury, and (3) certain restrictions
on punitive damage awards); see also H.R. 534, 109th Cong. (2005) (limits noneco-
nomic damages to $250,000).
323 National Medical Error Disclosure and Compensation Act, S. 1784, 109th
Cong. (2005) (requirements for indemnification from state liability include admitting
to mistakes and entering into settlement negotiations).
324 Id.
32' 42 U.S.C. § 263(b); Mammography Quality Standards Act of 1992, Pub.
L.No. 102-539, 106 Stat. 3547.
326 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Health Meeting Fails to
Bridge Partisan Rift, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2010, at Al.
327 The White House, The President's Proposal 1 (Feb. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/summary-presidents-proposal.pdf.
328 Id. at 3.
329 Stolberg & Pear, supra note 326.
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described earlier demonstrates, consideration does not automatically
result in enactment of the proposals in question. Thus, it is likely that
this Article's initial proposal for exclusive federal jurisdiction over
both procedural and substantive issues involving interstate telemedi-
cine disputes is a long-term goal. In the short term, it may be realistic
to envision limited federal procedural involvement by requiring re-
moval of interstate telemedicine disputes to federal court. Even in this
limited form, a federal court would help to reduce legal liability un-
certainty and costs by making it more difficult for parties to forum
shop in order to gain advantage in litigation. In the long-term, should
complete federal authority over interstate telemedicine disputes be
realized, the costs of uncertainty and conflicts as to where jurisdiction
lies and the treatment of similar issues in different states will be re-
duced. Such uniformity in other areas of health care touching upon
telemedicine will likewise encourage greater interstate delivery of
health care. For instance, the requirements of the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO), a private ac-
creditation organization, 330 may be applied to telemedical credential-
ing requirements. 3 3 1 Uniformity may also be achieved by revising the
federal HIPPAA statute barring states from promulgating stricter
standards of data privacy.
B. Federal Regulation Advances Public Policy Goals in the Delivery
of Health Care
Uniformity in interstate telemedicine regulations and standards al-
so promotes public policy goals of greater quality and access to health
care that existing state regulatory systems are unable to resolve. In the
area of licensure, scholars have noted that federal licensure standards
promise greater access to health care by enabling health professionals
to treat underserved populations, such as rural residents, without re-
quiring these professionals to live in these areas. 3 32 Professor Alison
Sulentic notes that "higher national standards for entry-to-practice
may translate to a higher standard of practice through easier access to
state markets and enhanced competition." 33
Uniformity in other areas, such as medical malpractice coverage,
further impacts these policy considerations. For example, Professor
Noah has observed that differing state insurance requirements influ-
330 Eleanor D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a Substitutefor Direct Gov-
ernment Regulation in Public Health Insurance Programs: When is it Appropriate?,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 52 (1994).
331 See Volkert, supra note 11, at 158-59.
332 Sulentic, supra note 229, at 36.
3 Id. at 37.
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ence where health professionals choose to practice, as there is evi-
dence suggesting that they avoid jurisdictions with higher malpractice
damage awards and unfavorable procedures.334
C. Foundations for Federal Regulation are Currently in Place for
Interstate Telemedicine
As discussed earlier, the transition from state to federal regulation
is feasible because several aspects of the health care industry are al-
ready subject to national standards and procedures. The transfor-
mation of a state licensing system to a national system offers a prime
example, as educational and specialization requirements have come to
follow a national standard and existing federal licensing models are in
place in limited circumstances. 3 35 Another related example is accredi-
tation requirements, as Medicare and Medicaid already impose opera-
tional standards on health care entities in exchange for funding. 336 in
particular, hospitals are subject to the rules of the JCAHO.337 Accord-
ing to Kevin Outterson, "[t]he uniform national standards of the Joint
Commission [JACHO] represent a federalization of hospital licensing
standards, enforced upon state licensed hospitals through the vector of
Medicare."338 Thus, the foundations for a national telemedicine regu-
latory system are in place in several areas and provide a working
model for those areas where there is lack of uniformity.
D. Adoption of Health Care Delivery Models on National and
Regional Scales Demonstrate that Domestic Federal Regulation is a
Successful Alternative
Finally, the experiences of a few other nations in establishing uni-
form regulations and standards to telemedicine support the assertion
that uniformity in this industry is the optimal solution. As alluded to
earlier, Malaysia serves as an instructive example of an overarching
telemedicine regime because it is a forerunner in enacting laws that
regulate telemedicine. 339 Malaysia's Telemedicine Act of 1997 grants
334 Noah, supra note 125, at 186.
335 See supra Part I1I.D.
336 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (2006) (defining 'hospital' within the context of
Medicare regulations); 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m) (defining 'home health services' within
the context of Medicare regulations); 42 C.F.R. § 484.1-.55 (2001) (regulating various
types of providers).
337 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395b(a).
338 Outterson, supra note 128, at 519.
339 Hsing-Hao Wu, Evolving Medical Service In The Information Age: A
Legal Analysis of Applying Telemedicine Programs In Taiwan, 27 MED. & L. 775,
784 (2008) (Malaysia's telemedicine law "specifically addresses legal issues concern-
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a certificate to practice telemedicine to physicians who are licensed to
practice in that nation and those who are licensed abroad.340 On a re-
gional level, the EU has demonstrated the irrelevance of geographic
barriers with regards to ensuring access to and providing quality med-
ical treatment. As discussed earlier, 34 1 the EU's "Doctor's Directive
93/16" permits a physician to practice in all member states provided
that he or she obtain a diploma from one member state that meets the
Directive's minimum training requirements. 342 The European Court of
Justice (ECJ) further diminished the importance of borders for medi-
cal care in its application of the EU's Working Time Directive (WTD)
to health services by extending the WTD's restriction on working
hour and mandatory rest periods to this sector. 34 3 While the EU does
not directly address telemedicine, the implementation of such
measures support the proposition that the development of a cross-
jurisdictional approach to the delivery of health care is a more feasible
and desirable alternative than geographic based initiatives.
VI. THE POTENTIAL OF TELEMEDICINE AND THE
GLOBAL REGULATORY REGIME
The above examples of a national telemedicine regime in the U.S.
can provide workable models for an international telemedicine re-
gime. Just as a federal authority over interstate telemedicine offers the
most viable solution, the international community should consider an
international institution or legal mechanism to regulate and adjudicate
issues involving international telemedicine.
As mentioned before, there are no international telemedicine
agreements. Some scholars predict that existing multilateral trade
agreements pertaining to cross-border services, such the General
Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) or the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may evolve to include provisions
liberalizing trade in health care services. " While this may be the
case, it is important to caution that the existing frameworks of these
agreements are likely ill-equipped to deal with unique health-related
barriers addressed in this Article for several reasons. First, the en-
forcement of GATS provisions under the World Trade Organization's
ing telemedicine, such as licensure, informed consent and telemedicine standard
development.").
340 See Telemedicine Act 1997, Act 564 cl. 3(1) & 4(1) (Malay.).
341 See supra Part 11.
342 Council Directive 93/16/EEC, supra note 73, at 1-24.
343 Scott L. Greer, Choosing Paths in European Union Health Services Poli-
cy: A Political Analysis of a Critical Juncture, 18 J. EUR. Soc. POL'Y 219, 222 (2008).
3 E.g., McLean, supra note 14, at 501.
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(WTO) dispute settlement mechanism is an inappropriate and general-
ly unavailable forum for resolving medical malpractice disputes
among private parties. The WTO restricts standing to Member gov-
ernments for a GATS-based violation, and private parties are afforded
no legal protection unless they can garner enough political support for
a government to bring a claim on their behalf 34 5 Even when a private
party does convince a government to represent her on a claim, the
claim may only be made against another government and the only
relief available is a prospective remedy of the GATS violation.346
Thus, the inability of private parties to take legal action against other
offending private entities and to obtain compensation by injured par-
ties discourages parties from participating in cross-border health care
services.347 Second, the WTO offers no recognized authoritative plat-
form by which uniform standards or regulations may be promulgated
to member states related to the delivery of health care. Third, dissent-
ing WTO members may invoke the GATS exception clause allowing
noncompliance for public health protection under Article XIV. 34 8
Thus, in order for existing multilateral trade agreements such as
GATS to be effective, the forums in which they carried and enforced
must be re-examined and altered in order to accommodate the unique
challenges of international telemedicine.
The difficulties involved in bringing about the above changes
prompt a consideration of other feasible alternatives. One such alter-
native may involve the establishment and/or allocation of an entity or
mechanism with an established expertise in the health field to help
promulgate supranational regulatory framework and standards. 34 9 For
345 See Thomas R. McLean, The Offshoring of American Medicine: Scope,
Economic Issues and Legal Liabilities, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 205, 248-249 (2005).
346 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 2, Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The
Legal Texts 353 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legale/28-dsu.pdf.
347 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Legal Integration of NAFTA through Su-
pranational Adjudication, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 349, 351-52 (2003). The lack of legal
protection for private persons engaged in cross-border services may be compared with
Westbrook's analysis of international investors, as these parties are making financial
commitments to projects located in foreign jurisdictions and vulnerable to those for-
eign states' laws.
348 See Nicolas F. Diebold, The Morals And Order Exceptions In WTO Law:
Balancing The Toothless Tiger And The Undermining Mole, II J. INT'L EcON. L. 43,
43-44 (2008).
349 See generally Amar Gupta & Deth Sao, Harmonization of International
Legal Structure for Fostering Professional Services: Lessons from Early U.S. Feder-
al-State Relations, 18 CARDOzO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 239 (2010).
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example, the WHO is a prime example proponents use to advance this
proposal, as it has the global expertise, reputation, and resources to act
as an authoritative body with similar responsibilities as the U.S. feder-
al government in the health care field. 35 0 Notably, the WHO compris-
es of 193 member nations,35 1 one of the largest memberships of an
international body or treaty. 352 Because the WHO embraces and in-
corporates more countries than many other organizations, there may
be greater acceptance by the international community for WHO-
initiated measures in the health care arena.
The WHO would establish and ensure compliance with regula-
tions and standards pertaining to the international practice of telemed-
icine. 3 53 For example, the WHO has recent experience in this capacity
in promulgating the International Health Regulations (IHR), an inter-
national legal instrument that is binding on all WHO member states.
Entered into force in 2007, the IHR requires countries to report public
health events to the WHO and improve their public health surveillance
and response systems.354 Recognizing that there are certain situations
where protection of public health is an "inherently multigovernmental
concern," the WHO developed the IHR in response to the global im-
pact of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and in prepara-
tion for the global spread of the Avian Flu. 35 5 Furthermore, the WHO
may ultimately serve as the final arbiter of legal disputes involving
healthcare issues that transcend national barriers and involve interna-
tional parties. 356 Thus, in the interests of advancing the policy goals of
greater quality and access to health care, nations may be increasingly
willing to defer authority in various aspects of transnational healthcare
services to global institutions such as the WHO.
CONCLUSION
Telemedicine offers the potential to improve existing health care
systems on national and international levels. At the same time that
350 See Blum, supra note 14, at 89-91.
351 Governance of WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/about/governance/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
352 In comparison, there are 140 signatory countries to the GATS. The Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services (GA TS): Objectives, Coverage and Disciplines,
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/gatsqa-e.htm#2
(last visited Jan. 13, 2011).
3 Gulick, supra note 304, at 212.
354 What are the International Health Regulations?, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/features/qa/39/en/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
35s Kumanan Wilson et al., The New International Health Regulations and the
Federalism Dilemma, PLOS MED., Jan. 2006, at 30, 30.
356 Gulick, supra note 304, at 212.
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telemedicine provides a feasible and ready solution to health care cri-
ses in nations such as the U.S., it motivates reconsideration and rea-
lignment of the degree of sovereignty that local, county, state, and
national governments have traditionally held or have assumed over
the years. The cross-border nature of telemedicine involves opportuni-
ties and challenges, as the ability to deliver health care across distanc-
es not only achieves public policy goals of greater quality and access
to health care, but also creates jurisdictional conflicts within and
among nations. The experience of the U.S. shows that such jurisdic-
tional conflicts, if resolved appropriately, could be regarded as a posi-
tive rather than a negative consequence of the development of tele-
medicine. As a study of the development of state authority over health
care and the determination of the unconstitutionality of state regula-
tion of telemedicine demonstrates, the need to relinquish local control
in favor of a centralized authority is consistent with the provisions of
the U.S. Constitution and other governing principles, and does not
violate any immutable constitutional or ethical principles.
As we look at the dilemma of health care and mounting costs and
poor quality of its delivery, we have to think of more revolutionary
changes. This dilemma is similar to the Y2K problem with a fixed
date, which forced the financial industry and other companies to em-
brace nontraditional solutions, such as getting work done abroad or
relying on foreign programmers to come to the U.S.357 Until 1999,
such practices were frowned upon for reasons ranging from violation
of corporate policies to breach of customer data privacy.358 The firm
deadline of December 31, 1999, forced the companies to become
more flexible. 3 59 As we face a similar dilemma in health care with
escalating costs and growing discontent, but with no "very hard dead-
- * 360-line" in existence to force cohesive action, our policymakers will be
increasingly compelled to look at nontraditional options that involve
rethinking the status of relationships between state governments and
national governments on various facets of health care.
3 Amar Gupta, Raj K. Goyal, Keith A. Joiner, & Sanjay Saini, Outsourcing
in the Healthcare Industry: Information Technology, Intellectual Property, and Allied
Aspects, 21 INFO. RESOURES MGMT. J. 1, 7-8 (2008).
358 Id.
359 id
360 See id. at 7.
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